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DEFERENCE, CHENERY, AND FOIA 
MARGARET B. KWOKA* 
ABSTRACT 
 Litigation fails to check adequately agency secrecy decisions 
under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).  To vindicate 
the public’s right to know what its government is up to, the dy-
namic of FOIA litigation needs fundamental change.  This Article 
builds on previous work documenting that courts routinely defer 
to agency decisions to withhold records from the public, despite 
Congress’s clear mandate for de novo judicial review.  In this Ar-
ticle, a paradox is revealed: while courts do not effectuate true de 
novo review, they rely on that statutory standard to allow agen-
cies to raise claims of exemption in litigation not relied on in the 
agency’s response to a request for information.  As a result, re-
questers end up in a worse position under de novo review than 
they would have been if Congress had chosen deferential review 
in FOIA cases.  Given existing practice, FOIA’s goal of transpar-
ency would be best served by relocating FOIA within a more typ-
ical administrative law paradigm.  Chiefly, it contends that the 
observed deference justifies applying the Chenery principle to 
FOIA litigation, which would preclude agencies from asserting 
exemption claims for the first time in litigation.  This Article 
demonstrates that not only can the application of Chenery be jus-
tified doctrinally and theoretically, but also that the benefits of 
constraining agency litigation positions outweigh potential costs, 
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rendering FOIA litigation a more fundamentally fair process that 
better advances the goals of FOIA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
FOIA represents one of the strongest government accountability 
measures Congress has ever adopted, granting every person the right to ac-
cess government records subject to only a small set of enumerated exemp-
tions.1  FOIA was the first law of its kind, but it has sparked an internation-
al wave of open records laws adopted in countries as disparate as France,2 
                                                          
 1.  5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 2.  Loi 78-753 du 17 juillet 1978 portant diverses mesures d’amélioration des relations entre 
l’administration et le public et diverses dispositions d’ordre administratif, social et fiscal (Fr.) [Act 
No. 78-753 on various measures for improved relations between the Civil Service and the public 
and on various arrangements of administrative, social and fiscal nature], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 18, 1978, p. 2851, availa-
ble at http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/4542/file/Loi_n%C2%B0_78-
753_measures_for_relations_Civil%20Service_and_public_am_2011_fr.pdf. 
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Mexico,3 and China,4 and in international institutions such as the European 
Union5 and the United Nations.6  Access to information has been re-
conceptualized as a human right7 and proclaimed fundamental to a democ-
racy.8 
Despite the importance of access to information, Congress recognized 
the need to protect other important interests such as privacy, national securi-
ty, and trade secrets, and accordingly provided statutory exemptions from 
mandatory disclosure.9  When an agency invokes an exemption to deny ac-
cess to requested records, the requester is entitled to challenge that decision 
in court.10  Despite these important competing interests, Congress believed 
the goal of maximum transparency was so important that it mandated de 
novo judicial review of any case challenging the government’s withholding 
of records from the public.11  As such, FOIA litigation is one of the few in-
stances in which judges reviewing agency actions owe no deference to the 
agency’s position.12  FOIA’s strong review provision was meant to serve as 
a check on agency power and to protect the public’s right to information.13 
                                                          
 3.  Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública Gubernamental [Federal 
Transparency and Access to Public Government Information Law], Diario Oficial de la Federa-
ción [DO], 11 de Junio de 2002 (Mex.), available at http://www.freedominfo.org/wp-
content/uploads/documents/mexico_ley.pdf. 
 4.  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Tiaoli [Regulations of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China on Open Government Information] (promulgated by the St. Council, Apr. 
5, 2007, effective May 1, 2008), translated in THE CHINA LAW CENTER, YALE LAW SCHOOL 
(Feb. 2009), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CL-OGI-Regs-
English.pdf. 
 5.  Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing 
the European Communities and certain related acts, art. 255(1), Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340), 
available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1997:340:FULL:EN:PDF. 
 6.  U.N. Hum. Res. Comm., General Comment 34, Article 19: Freedom of Opinion and Ex-
pression, ¶¶ 18–19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011).  
 7.  See, e.g., CHERYL ANN BISHOP, ACCESS TO INFORMATION AS A HUMAN RIGHT 208 
(2012); Patrick Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information and Openness: Fundamental Human 
Rights?, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 177, 214 (2006). 
 8.  See Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 
1–2 (1976) (“[T]he right to know . . . is necessary for collective decision-making in a democratic 
society.”).  
 9.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012) (listing exemptions to disclosure).  
 10.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (2012). 
 11.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (2012); 111 CONG. REC. APP A946-48 (1965) (statement of H.R. 
Rep. Fascell); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1497, at 30 (1966) (“The proceedings are to be de novo so 
that the court can consider the propriety of the withholding instead of being restricted to judicial 
sanctioning of agency discretion.”). 
 12.  See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 679, 712–13 (2002). 
 13.  112 CONG. REC. 13,659 (1966) (statement of Rep. Gallagher) (“One of the most im-
portant provisions of the bill is subsection C, which grants authority to the Federal district courts 
to order production of records improperly withheld.  This means that for the first time in the Gov-
KwokaFinalBookProof 5/14/2014  10:51 AM 
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Not only does FOIA’s de novo review provision render FOIA litiga-
tion an outlier in administrative law with respect to standards of review, but 
it also renders inapplicable other fundamental principles of administrative 
law.14  Most importantly, courts have unanimously concluded that FOIA 
litigation is exempt from a longstanding administrative review doctrine—
the Chenery principle.15  Under SEC v. Chenery Corp.,16 most agency ac-
tions challenged in court must stand or fall on the justifications offered by 
the agency at the time the decision was made, rather than any post-hoc ra-
tionalizations.17  Chenery has the effect of constraining courts’ deference to 
agency actions, affording deference only to the agency professionals’ con-
temporaneous judgments.18  No consideration, much less deference, is owed 
any new arguments lawyers might make in the course of litigation.19  In 
FOIA cases, however, because Chenery does not apply, the agency’s law-
yers, almost always housed not in the defending agency but in the Depart-
ment of Justice (“DOJ”), are free to advance any arguments they see fit, 
whether or not they were relied on during the administrative process.20 
While the standards employed in FOIA litigation seem clear and the 
exceptional treatment of these cases is facially reasonable, the reality of 
FOIA litigation reveals a much more complex—and ultimately problemat-
ic—picture of judicial review under FOIA.  Despite the formal de novo 
standard of review, courts routinely give great deference to agencies’ posi-
tions in FOIA litigation: courts both explicitly defer to certain types of gov-
ernment representations that are critical to the determination of whether the 
public has a right of access to records and implicitly defer to agencies by 
giving them special procedural advantages such as displacing discovery and 
making trials effectively unavailable.21  Perhaps, even more surprisingly, 
empirical evidence suggests that courts may be giving substantially more 
deference to agencies in FOIA cases than in other types of litigation, as evi-
denced by a significantly higher affirmance rate of agency FOIA withhold-
                                                          
ernment’s history, a citizen will no longer be at the end of the road when his request for a Gov-
ernment document arbitrarily has been turned down by some bureaucrat.”). 
 14.  See infra Part I.B. 
 15.  See infra Part II.B. 
 16.  SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp. 
(Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
 17.  Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196; Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 87. 
 18.  See infra Part III.A. 
 19.  See infra Part III.A. 
 20.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012); see also Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 795 F.2d 205, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Starr, J., dissenting) (noting that FOIA litiga-
tors may advance exemptions never contemplated by agency experts). 
 21.  Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 211–35 (2013). 
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ing decisions than other agency actions, which are explicitly entitled to def-
erential review.22 
When courts’ practical deference in FOIA cases is combined with their 
refusal to apply the Chenery principle to FOIA review, it results in a per-
verse litigation dynamic: agencies get the benefit of deference, but are not 
constrained by Chenery’s requirement that they rely on the reasons they ar-
ticulated to the requesters in the first instance.  Instead, courts in FOIA cas-
es are applying the same deferential principles to any argument advanced, 
whether it is rooted in the justification the agency relied on at the time of 
the decision or whether it was first advanced by the lawyers representing 
the agency in litigation.  Requesters, however, are getting the worst of both 
worlds.  They have an uphill battle to convince the court of their positions, 
and the rationale they are fighting may have changed by the time the litiga-
tion crystallizes. 
FOIA litigation, therefore, exists in the vacuum between the ideal 
Congress set out for it—true de novo review—and the judicial review re-
gime applied to the vast majority of agency actions, which incorporates 
both deference doctrines and the constraint of the Chenery principle.  Cer-
tainly, restoring true de novo judicial review in FOIA cases would imple-
ment the intent of Congress to protect the right of the public to access the 
maximum possible amount of government information without infringing 
on the important interests protected by the exemptions to disclosure.23  
FOIA’s history and precedent, however, suggest serious barriers to this 
remedy: Congress has tried before to restore de novo review without signif-
icant success; judges and litigants feel constrained by precedent; courts ex-
hibit understandable reluctance to second-guess certain types of agency rep-
resentations; and much of the deference given is difficult to identify, much 
less correct.24  Given the constraints that impede achieving true de novo re-
view, the next best alternative for FOIA litigation is not the current regime 
under which courts act as if de novo review is possible but fall short.25  Ra-
ther, the next best alternative is to shift our thinking wholesale to a more 
typical administrative review scenario.26 
This Article posits that reconceptualizing FOIA litigation as within the 
normal administrative law paradigm offers an avenue to fixing FOIA litiga-
                                                          
 22.  See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 169 (2010) (reporting af-
firmance rates across agencies, standards of review, and types of cases as falling between sixty 
and seventy percent); Verkuil, supra note 12, at 719 (reporting a ninety percent affirmance rate in 
FOIA cases). 
 23.  See Kwoka, supra note 21, at 196–200 (documenting the legislative history evidencing 
Congress’s intent to provide strong judicial oversight). 
 24.  See infra Part I. 
 25.  See infra Part I. 
 26.  See infra Part II.B. 
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tion.27  Under this reconceptualization, because courts are in practice al-
ready deferring to agency decisions to withhold records under FOIA, the 
Chenery principle would apply to constrain the rationales that receive def-
erential treatment to those articulated by the agency at the time the decision 
was made and by the agency professionals responsible for the administra-
tion of transparency laws.28  To develop this proposal, Part I describes the 
paradox of FOIA litigation: while FOIA’s status as an exception to typical 
administrative law review principles was meant to ensure more stringent 
judicial oversight concerning agency secrecy, in practice it has resulted in 
deeply unbalanced litigation strongly favoring such secrecy.  Part II em-
ploys the theoretical justifications for Chenery, including the inextricable 
link between Chenery and deference to agency actions, to demonstrate that 
Chenery’s application to FOIA cases is justified.  Lastly, Part III explores 
how Chenery would operate in FOIA litigation to maximize government 
transparency as intended by Congress, both in litigation and at the adminis-
trative level. 
I.  THE FOIA LITIGATION PARADOX 
FOIA affords every person the right to request and receive copies of 
any government agency’s records, subject only to nine exemptions enumer-
ated in the statute.29  Those exemptions protect certain important public and 
private interests, including national security, law enforcement investiga-
tions, personal privacy, confidential commercial or financial information, 
and agency deliberations.30  If an agency wants to respond to a FOIA re-
quest by withholding some or all of the requested records pursuant to one of 
the exemptions, it must send the requester a denial letter that states the rea-
sons for the denial and explains the right of a requester to administratively 
appeal the denial.31  If the requester follows the appeals process and is again 
denied, she may then bring a lawsuit challenging the denial in federal dis-
trict court.32  Alternatively, if the agency fails to timely respond either to the 
initial request or the administrative appeal, the requester may proceed di-
                                                          
 27.  See infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 28.  See infra Part III. 
 29.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012); see also infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 30.  See id. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (exempting from mandatory disclosure records that are (1) 
properly classified under an executive order, (2) related solely to internal personnel rules, (3) ex-
empt from disclosure by another statute, (4) trade secrets or confidential commercial information, 
(5) not discoverable in ordinary civil litigation against the agency, (6) going to cause an unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy if disclosed, (7) within certain categories of law enforcement 
records, (8) related to certain banking matters, and (9) regarding the location of wells). 
 31.  Id. § 552(a)(6)(A).  
 32.  Id. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
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rectly to federal court as if she received a final denial from the agency.33  
Either way, once in court, the principle issue in FOIA cases is whether 
withheld records (or portions thereof) fall within one of the exemptions to 
disclosure or whether the requester has a right to access them under FOIA.34 
FOIA litigation currently stands as an anomaly in administrative law in 
at least two principle respects.  First, rather than any of the myriad deferen-
tial standards usually associated with review of agency actions—be it defer-
ence afforded under the principles announced in Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council,35 Skidmore v. Swift & Co,36 Auer v. 
Robbins,37 or deference under statutory standards such as arbitrary and ca-
pricious, substantial evidence, or other iterations—for FOIA cases the stat-
ute itself provides that “the court shall determine the matter de novo.”38  
Thus, in reviewing a denial under FOIA, courts owe agencies no deference 
with respect to the agency’s fact-finding, legal interpretations, or applica-
tion of law to facts.39  Rather, courts must look at the matter as if deciding it 
in the first instance.40  Second, because of this standard of review, another 
nearly ubiquitous administrative law doctrine fails to be invoked: the 
Chenery principle.41  Under the Chenery principle, agencies’ decisions can 
only be affirmed on the grounds articulated by the agency at the time the 
decision was made.42  Unlike in other administrative cases, in FOIA cases 
an agency may advance any argument in litigation to defend its position, 
whether or not relied upon at the time of the denial.43 
The paradox of FOIA litigation becomes clear, however, when the 
myth of de novo review is revealed.44  Because courts in effect have created 
a unique system of deference in FOIA cases, requesters fail to reap the ben-
efit of the de novo review standard on the books.45  Meanwhile, agencies 
take advantage of the opportunity to raise any and all arguments in favor of 
affirmance, often changing their justifications as the dispute proceeds.46  As 
                                                          
 33.  Id. § 552(a)(4)(C)(1). 
 34.  See id. § 552(a)(4). 
 35.  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 36.  323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 37.  519 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 38.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); see also Zaring, supra note 22, at 160 (describing various defer-
ential standards of review employed in administrative law and noting that de novo review is not 
“at the heart of administrative law”).   
 39.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Louis v. Dep’t of Labor, 419 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 42.  SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943). 
 43.  See infra Parts II.B–C.   
 44.  See infra Part I.A. 
 45.  See infra Part I.B. 
 46.  See infra Part I.C. 
KwokaFinalBookProof 5/14/2014  10:51 AM 
2014] Deference, Chenery, and FOIA 1067 
this Article demonstrates, the end result grossly distorts the litigation in fa-
vor of agency secrecy and fails to provide the meaningful judicial check on 
agencies’ FOIA decisions that Congress intended.47 
A.  The Myth of De Novo Review 
Without question, de novo review is the standard on the books.48  
Moreover, the legislative history of FOIA shows that Congress was 
thoughtful and deliberate when it chose de novo review, wanting courts to 
have meaningful oversight over agency secrecy decisions and to act as a 
protector of the public’s right to maximum access to information.49  In fact, 
many in Congress believed the strong judicial review provision was one of 
FOIA’s most important features.50 
Under a conventional understanding of standards of review, the expec-
tation is that fewer agency actions scrutinized de novo should be affirmed 
than those agency actions treated deferentially.51  After all, when courts de-
fer to agencies, some number of cases should be affirmed even though the 
court itself would have come out a different way had it addressed the ques-
tion in the first instance.52  This distinction is precisely why Congress un-
derstood its choice of de novo review in FOIA cases to be meaningful.53 
Despite the clarity of Congress’s choice of standard of review in FOIA 
cases, empirical evidence suggests that courts are not actually applying a 
true de novo standard in reviewing agency decisions to withhold records.  
In the leading study, which examined all district court FOIA decisions over 
a ten-year period, agency denials of information under FOIA were affirmed 
in a full ninety percent of cases decided, despite the stringent de novo 
                                                          
 47.  See infra Part I.C. 
 48.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (2012).  
 49.  For a detailed account of the legislative history of the standard of review provision in 
FOIA, see Kwoka, supra note 21, at 196–200.   
 50.  See supra note 13. 
 51.  Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999); Verkuil, supra note 12, at 692; Zaring, 
supra note 22, at 136–38. 
 52.  See Zaring, supra note 22, at 136–38 (describing the presumed distinctions between 
standards of review). 
 53.  See Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 840 F.2d 26, 31 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (observ-
ing that de novo review “exerts a profound effect upon the amount of respect the court must yield 
to agency determinations”), vacated on other grounds, 898 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rizzo v. 
Tyler, 438 F. Supp. 895, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting that de novo review “reflects Congress’s 
intent to provide greater judicial scrutiny over an agency’s FOIA determinations than over other 
agency rulings”); 120 CONG. REC. 36, 626 (1974) (statement of Rep. Reid) (“The courts, in my 
view, have a duty to look behind any claim of exemption, which all too often in the past has been 
used to cover up inefficiency or embarrassment even in foreign policy matters which, many times, 
are fully known by other countries but not printable in our own—supposedly the most democratic 
and most open in the world.”). 
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standard of review.54  By contrast, other agency actions, almost always re-
viewed deferentially by the courts, are affirmed only sixty to seventy per-
cent of the time.55  This result is, of course, the precise opposite of what one 
would expect based on our understanding of how standards of review 
should affect case outcomes.56  The ninety percent affirmance rate in FOIA 
cases is inconsistent with the de novo review in which courts claim to en-
gage in these cases.57 
As I have argued elsewhere, the reality of FOIA litigation exposes 
strong deference that has crept into FOIA jurisprudence.58  I divided this 
system of deference into two sets of practices, which I labeled “spoken” and 
“unspoken” deference.59  The spoken deference category encompasses in-
stances in which courts expressly defer to agency positions on a relevant 
question in a FOIA case.60  Unspoken deference refers to seemingly neutral 
procedural rulings exercised routinely as a matter of discretion in FOIA liti-
gation, but which cumulatively have the effect of preventing meaningful 
challenges to the government’s positions in FOIA litigation and thus pre-
venting true de novo review.61 
One example of spoken deference arises in litigation over agency 
claims that records are exempt from FOIA’s mandatory disclosure provi-
sions because they have been properly classified to protect national security 
interests.62  While national security is an area in which the judiciary has his-
torically deferred to the political branches, Congress’s de novo review pro-
vision in FOIA was meant to apply equally to national security based 
                                                          
 54.  Verkuil, supra note 12, at 713. 
 55.  See Zaring, supra note 22, at 169 (“For Chevron review, Skidmore review, and arbitrary 
and capricious review, the studies suggest that, at least as the judiciary is currently comprised, 
agencies win between 60 and 70% of their appeals with few exceptions.”).  
 56.  Verkuil, supra note 12, at 713. 
 57.  See id. at 730 (“FOIA cases are hard if not impossible to explain in terms of outcomes 
analysis if de novo is to be a meaningful standard of review.”); see also Zaring, supra note 22, at 
176 n.134 (noting that Verkuil’s finding is “surprising” in light of his own research indicating that 
agencies are affirmed at approximately the same rates across types of decisions, standards of re-
view, and agencies involved).  Leading theories of dispute resolution, including predispute selec-
tion effects and settlement rates, likewise cannot explain the astronomical affirmance rate in FOIA 
cases.  Kwoka, supra note 21, at 206–11.  
 58.  See generally Kwoka, supra note 21 (arguing that courts generally defer to the govern-
ment despite reciting a de novo standard of review in FOIA cases). 
 59.  Id. at 211. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. 
 62.  These claims are made under FOIA’s exemption 1, which exempts records that are “(A) 
specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the 
interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to 
such Executive order . . . .”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2012).  
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claims of exemption as it does to other exemption claims.63  In 1974 
amendments to FOIA, Congress even legislatively overruled the Supreme 
Court’s invocation of deference to national security based FOIA denials by 
amending the exemption based on classification to make clear the courts 
were to review whether withheld records are classified properly.64 
Despite the clarity of Congress’s intent, courts have routinely deferred 
to agency FOIA denials based on national security, declaring that courts 
must affirm a national security denial so long as the record “‘logically falls 
into the category of the exemption indicated,’ and there is no evidence of 
bad faith on the part of the agency.”65  One recent U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit decision was even more blunt: “[T]his Court must adopt 
a deferential posture in FOIA cases regarding the uniquely executive pur-
view of national security.”66  Commentators agree that national security 
claims are not truly reviewed de novo by the courts,67 and DOJ has issued 
guidance to agencies declaring that, “courts generally have heavily deferred 
to agency expertise in national security cases.”68  Supporting this view, one 
DOJ report found not a single ultimately successful challenge to an agen-
cy’s national security exemption claim under FOIA,69 and a later empirical 
study revealed that there was likewise no successful challenge over a ten-
year period studied in the 1990s.70 
                                                          
 63.  The standard of review provision in FOIA is the same for all claims of exemption.  Id. 
§ 552(a)(4)(B). 
 64.  Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)); see also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81 (1973), superseded by 
statute, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (amending the 1967 Free-
dom of Information Act).  In fact, Congress’s conviction on this point was so strong that Congress 
overrode President Ford’s veto of the legislation reinstating de novo review of national security 
claims under FOIA.  See Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1190–91 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“In 1974 Con-
gress overrode a presidential veto and amended the FOIA for the express purpose of changing this 
aspect of the Mink case.”); 120 CONG. REC. 36, 243 (1974) (veto message from President Ford).   
 65.  Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 555–56 (1st Cir. 1993).  
 66.  ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 681 F.3d 61, 76 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 67.  See, e.g., Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing 
Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 165 (2006) (“In a subtle but telling shift of nomen-
clature, the D.C. Circuit . . . called the standard of review in [national security] cases [under 
FOIA] ‘the substantial weight standard’ rather than the de novo standard of review mandated by 
Congress.”); Christina E. Wells, “National Security” Information and the Freedom of Information 
Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195, 1208 (2004) (explaining that, in regard to national security claims 
under FOIA, “[courts] effectively apply something less” than “de novo review”).  
 68. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 147 (2009) 
[hereinafter GUIDE TO FOIA]. 
 69.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE & PRIVACY ACT 
OVERVIEW 83–86 (2000). 
 70.  Verkuil, supra note 12, at 715 n.159. 
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National security is not the only realm in which spoken deference aris-
es under FOIA.  Courts engage in spoken deference in assessing agency 
claims under at least two other of the Act’s nine exemptions to disclosure.71  
First, when invoking the law enforcement exemption, courts have routinely 
deferred to agencies’ claims that records were “compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes,” a threshold inquiry under the exemption.72  This deference 
is granted to agencies whose primary activities are law enforcement relat-
ed73 and, in some circuits, the agency’s status as a law enforcement agency 
itself is accepted as conclusive proof that the records meet this require-
ment.74  Second, although not yet embraced by a precedential opinion, some 
district courts have deferred to agencies’ representations about their own 
decisionmaking process as part of the review of the agency’s claim that rec-
ords are exempt under the deliberative process privilege.75  Where a record 
falls within the decisionmaking process (as part of deliberations versus jus-
tifying a final decision) is a critical inquiry concerning whether the privi-
lege applies.76  As each of these examples shows, spoken deference applies 
                                                          
 71.  In addition to exemptions 1, 5, and 7, some courts have deferred to agency positions tak-
en under exemption 3, which exempts records covered under other statutes, on the theory that the 
agencies are charged with interpreting those other statutes and those interpretations are entitled to 
either Chevron or Skidmore deference.  See, e.g., Landmark Legal Found. v. IRS, 267 F.3d 1132, 
1137 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying Skidmore deference to the IRS’s nonbinding interpretation of an 
exemption 3 statute); Lehrfeld v. Richardson, 132 F.3d 1463, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (applying 
Chevron deference to a binding regulation interpreting an exemption 3 statute).  Whether this in-
terpretation of exemption 3 in conjunction with the other referenced statutes is correct is still an 
open question.  See A. Michael’s Piano, Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 1994) (document-
ing a circuit split).   
 72.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012) (exempting “records or information compiled for law en-
forcement purposes” when release of the records would produce one of the enumerated harms 
listed under the exemption). 
 73.  Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (applying a presumption that an 
agency operates within its delegated purpose and, therefore, requiring “less exacting proof” that 
records were compiled for law enforcement purposes from agencies whose primary function is 
law enforcement); see also Tax Analysts v. IRS, 294 F.3d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that 
Pratt adopts a “deferential” approach to law enforcement agencies).  
 74.  See, e.g., Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 668 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 2011) (adopting 
the so-called “per se” rule that any records compiled by an agency whose primary function is law 
enforcement were compiled for law enforcement purposes).  In addition to deferring to agencies’ 
representations about whether records were compiled for law enforcement purposes, the D.C. Cir-
cuit has deferred to agency positions with respect to other inquiries relevant under exemption 7.  
See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (defer-
ring to the agency’s representations that release of records would interfere with a law enforcement 
investigation with potential national security implications).   
 75.  See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm’n, 600 F. Supp. 114, 118 
(D.D.C. 1984) (“There should be considerable deference to the [agency’s] judgment as to what 
constitutes . . . part of the agency give-and-take—of the deliberative process—by which the deci-
sion itself is made.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). 
 76.  See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (describing the deliberative process privilege). 
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not only to a relevant question, but often the relevant question that will de-
termine if a claimed exemption to disclosure applies or whether the records 
must be released. 
While spoken deference affects a substantial subset of the claims 
agencies might invoke to withhold records under FOIA, unspoken defer-
ence affects them all.  Through a series of procedural decisions that have 
become the norm in FOIA litigation, the government has gained great liti-
gation advantages.77  Many of these practices were developed in response to 
some unique features of FOIA litigation, namely that the government-
defendant bears the burden to prove that an exemption to disclosure ap-
plies78 and that there is an inherent information imbalance between the par-
ties insofar as the government has access to the disputed records and the re-
quester does not.79  Despite courts’ seemingly benign intentions, these 
procedural practices have the effect of deferring to the government’s secre-
cy positions in FOIA litigation.80 
First, courts have largely replaced the default system of civil discovery 
in FOIA cases, having categorically declared it to be inappropriate in FOIA 
cases because of the nature of the information imbalance.81  In its stead, 
courts have operated under a presumption that the only discovery necessary 
in FOIA litigation is the government’s production of an affidavit known as 
the Vaughn index, which lists the withheld records, claimed exemptions, 
and short justifications.82  These indices, however, have become exercises 
in boilerplate affidavit writing and, in any event, do not allow the requester 
to probe the veracity of the government’s representations through cross ex-
amination or multiple depositions.83  As a result, unless the government’s 
affidavit is facially flawed or inadequate, and so long as the requester can-
not produce evidence of actual bad faith on the part of the government (as is 
usually the case), the contents of the affidavit will be accepted as true by the 
                                                          
 77.  See infra notes 81–92 and accompanying text. 
 78.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (2012).  
 79.  For a full accounting of unspoken deference and its origins, see Kwoka, supra note 21, at 
221–35. 
 80.  See infra notes 94–95. 
 81.  See Wheeler v. CIA, 271 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D.D.C. 2003) (explaining that 
“[d]iscovery is generally unavailable in FOIA actions”).   
 82.  See Minier v. CIA, 88 F.3d 796, 803 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Vaughn indices are sometimes 
necessary because ordinary rules of discovery cannot be followed in FOIA cases where the issue 
is whether one party is entitled to non-disclosed documents.”); Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352 
& n.77 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (using the Vaughn procedure to justify the denial of further discovery).  
Courts sometimes articulate possible scenarios that would justify discovery, but those scenarios 
are extremely unlikely to actually arise in real FOIA litigation.  See Kwoka, supra note 21, at 
227–28. 
 83.  Goland, 607 F.2d at 357 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).   
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court.84  Thus, the inability to mount a serious challenge results in judicial 
deference to the government’s assertions about the justifications for secre-
cy. 
Second, courts have altered the normal procedures concerning sum-
mary judgment in a way that insulates the government’s assertions from de 
novo scrutiny.85  In FOIA litigation, rather than using summary judgment to 
weed out cases without genuine disputes of material fact, courts employ 
summary judgment to decide essentially all cases, as a routine matter.86  
This use of summary judgment is neither warranted nor neutral.87  Factual 
disputes that affect the outcome of the case—not pertaining to the contents 
of the requested records themselves—do arise with frequency in FOIA cas-
es.88  These disputes include why a document was prepared, how it was 
used, with whom it was shared, or disputes about the predicted effects of 
releasing the document such as whether release would interfere with an on-
going investigation or would contribute to the public’s understanding of the 
operations of government.89  Refusing to allow cases to go to trial on these 
questions, and instead resolving factual disputes at the summary judgment 
stage, ends up depriving the requester of meaningful opportunities to focus 
the judge’s attention on the important aspects of the dispute, cross-examine 
the government’s witnesses, and otherwise test the strength of the govern-
ment’s case.90 
What is more, courts have routinely adopted a practice of allowing the 
government a second crack at summary judgment when it fails to adequate-
ly oppose a plaintiff’s summary judgment motion the first time around, 
even though the government bears the burden to demonstrate sufficient evi-
                                                          
 84.  Kwoka, supra note 21, at 226.  
 85.  Interestingly, many of the same procedural distortions have been documented in the ad-
judication of qualified immunity defenses to constitutional tort actions, including limiting discov-
ery, altering burdens of proof, deciding questions of fact, and allowing serial motions for summary 
judgment.  Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role 
of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 84–98 (1998). 
 86.  Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 217, 259–
60 (2011) (reporting empirical findings that FOIA cases are almost never resolved at trial, repre-
senting 0.71% of all FOIA dispositions as compared with 3.44% of dispositions in other civil cas-
es, and that FOIA cases are overwhelmingly resolved on motion, representing 38.09% of all FOIA 
dispositions as compared with 12.08% of dispositions in other civil cases); see also Miscavige v. 
IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Generally, FOIA cases should be handled on motions for 
summary judgment, once the documents in issue are properly identified.”). 
 87.  Kwoka, supra note 86, at 227–44 (detailing the myriad factual disputes that FOIA cases 
regularly present).  
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 264–67, 273–76 (demonstrating that plaintiffs may fare better at trial than on sum-
mary judgment using interviews with attorneys who have conducted FOIA trials and some empiri-
cal evidence concerning outcomes of past FOIA trials).  
KwokaFinalBookProof 5/14/2014  10:51 AM 
2014] Deference, Chenery, and FOIA 1073 
dence to sustain its claim.91  In any other context, a party who bears the 
burden of proof and who fails to produce sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable fact-finder could find in his favor in opposition to a summary 
judgment motion would have a judgment entered against him.92  Allowing 
the government multiple bites of the summary judgment apple and resolv-
ing genuine factual disputes on summary judgment motions are practices 
that not only fail to incentivize the government to put forth its best case in 
the first instance, thus dragging out the litigation, but also deprive the re-
quester of meaningful procedural opportunities, and even of the judgments 
to which they are entitled under normal litigation rules. 
The end result of this collection of practices is deference to the gov-
ernment in FOIA litigation, but it is not easily classifiable into one of the 
types of deference used in other areas of administrative law.  Certainly, it is 
not Chevron type deference, as no particular agency is charged with inter-
preting ambiguities in FOIA93 and, in any case, FOIA denial letters lack the 
“force of law” necessary to entitle them to such deference.94  Some aspects 
of FOIA deference resemble arbitrary and capricious review used with re-
spect to fact-finding in informal agency adjudications,95 insofar as courts 
openly defer to agencies’ factual representations or accept representations 
in Vaughn indices, but “arbitrary or capricious” has never been articulated 
as a standard in FOIA cases.  Indeed, many of the deference doctrines under 
FOIA seem even more forceful than arbitrary or capricious review, because 
the courts in some FOIA cases accept the agencies’ factual representations 
absolutely so long as there is no evidence of bad faith, which may be more 
akin to the deference courts give to agencies’ interpretations of their own 
regulations under Auer.96  On the other hand, the types of procedural ad-
vantages that agencies enjoy in FOIA litigation have no analog in other 
                                                          
 91.  See, e.g., Elec. Frontier Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 826 F. Supp. 2d. 157, 175 
(D.D.C. 2011) (allowing the government to submit a renewed motion for summary judgment); 
Clemente v. FBI, 741 F. Supp. 2d 64, 89 (D.D.C. 2010) (same); Schoenman v. FBI, 604 F. Supp. 
2d 174, 204 (D.D.C. 2009) (same). 
 92.  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (granting defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment based on plaintiff’s lack of sufficient evidence).   
 93.  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984) (setting out a deference standard that applies when an agency interprets a statute it admin-
isters). 
 94.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2001) (noting that some informal 
rulings “‘do not carry the force of law and are not, like regulations, intended to clarify the rights 
and obligations of importers beyond the specific case under review’”).   
 95.  See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (apply-
ing arbitrary and capricious review to an informal adjudication), abrogated on other grounds by 
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).   
 96.  See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (explaining that agencies’ interpretations 
of their own regulations are “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula-
tion’”).  
KwokaFinalBookProof 5/14/2014  10:51 AM 
1074 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:1060 
parts of administrative law.  Instead, FOIA jurisprudence appears to have 
created its own deference doctrine through a collection of practices that 
have the end result of deferring to the agencies’ positions. 
While a facial anomaly, deference under FOIA can also be understood 
as just one more in a long line of variants on deference used in the context 
of administrative law.97  Recent scholarship has called into serious question 
whether there is a meaningful difference between the multitude of standards 
of review employed in administrative law, each of which purports to em-
body a different sort of deference.98  Empirical evidence suggests that, 
across the board, courts exhibit a similar level of deference to agencies irre-
spective of the formal deferential standard employed.99  The seemingly new 
variant on deference to agencies exhibited in FOIA case law may only 
amount to new vocabulary for the same type of deferential treatment of 
agencies courts employ in other contexts. 
B.  Courts’ Refusal to Apply Chenery to FOIA Cases 
In addition to FOIA’s formal de novo review standard, FOIA stands as 
an exception to the norms of administrative law in another crucial way: as 
an exception to the application of the Chenery principle.100  There is no dis-
agreement among the courts about the application of Chenery to FOIA liti-
gation: it does not apply.101  In fact, Chenery’s inapplicability to FOIA cas-
es is so uncontroversial that there are few arguments advanced or 
challenges made asserting the application of Chenery under FOIA and few 
decisions dealing with the question in depth.  In short, Chenery’s inextrica-
ble link to deference doctrines virtually mandates, in the view of the courts, 
that it not apply when courts review agency decisions to withhold records 
under FOIA under a de novo standard. 
                                                          
 97.  For a summary of the variants of deference used in administrative law review, see Zaring, 
supra note 22, at 143–53. 
 98.  See, e.g., id. at 153–69 (arguing that six different standards of review in administrative 
law all boil down to a review for reasonableness of the agency action); Ronald M. Levin, The 
Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1271 (1997) (noting 
that the D.C. Circuit recognizes little meaningful difference between Chevron step two and State 
Farm); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 761, 764 (2008) (noting that review of agency factfinding under “the substantial evidence 
standard” is essentially the same as arbitrary and capricious review); Matthew C. Stephenson & 
Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 598–99, 604 n.28 (2009) (ar-
guing that the single question Chevron really asks is whether the agency’s statutory interpretation 
is reasonable, and that this question is not very different from “hard look” review under State 
Farm). 
 99.  Zaring, supra note 22, at 169. 
 100.  For an overview of the Chenery principle, see infra Part II.A. 
 101.  See infra text accompanying notes 102–112. 
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The Ninth Circuit has provided one of the rare in-depth discussions re-
jecting a claim that Chenery should apply to FOIA.  In Louis v. United 
States Department of Labor,102 the court considered a challenge to an agen-
cy’s decision to withhold records under the Privacy Act,103 a complimentary 
law to FOIA that contains many parallel provisions regarding disclosure ob-
ligations and identical provisions for judicial review of agency decisions to 
keep records secret.104  The Department of Labor (“DOL”) had promulgated 
a rule invoking a provision of the Privacy Act that allows an agency to re-
fuse disclosure of certain systems of records.105  When the plaintiff request-
ed certain records, the DOL relied on that rule to deny the request.106  Once 
the plaintiff sued, however, the DOL raised the alternative argument that it 
was entitled to withhold the records under the deliberative process privi-
lege, which is a basis for invoking one of the Privacy Act exemptions to 
disclosure.107 
Reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the agen-
cy, the Ninth Circuit first invalidated the Department’s rule on the ground 
that the agency had failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure 
Act’s (“APA”) notice and comment requirements.108  Then, the district 
court considered the deliberative process claim, raised for the first time in 
the district court proceeding.  The plaintiff argued that the agency was not 
entitled to rely on a new theory to justify withholding the record because 
doing so would violate Chenery.109  The court concluded that Chenery did 
not apply to Privacy Act or FOIA claims precisely because decisions made 
under these acts are reviewed de novo and the agency’s determination is en-
titled to no deference.110  Chenery, the court said, “was premised on the pol-
icy that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the agency” 
when reviewing decisions that Congress “exclusively entrusted to an ad-
ministrative agency.”111  The court went on to explain that decisions under 
the Privacy Act and FOIA are not entrusted to a particular agency, but ra-
ther are mandated to be reviewed by courts de novo.112 
                                                          
 102.  419 F.3d 970, 977–79 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 103.  Id. at 972. 
 104.  Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012) (FOIA), with 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012) (the Privacy Act). 
 105.  Louis, 419 F.3d at 973–74. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 973.  
 108.  Id. at 977. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  A second rationale was articulated that is specific to the Privacy Act.  Id. at 977.  The 
court concluded that the agency could not be said to have passively waived the argument given the 
structure of the particular records request provision in the Privacy Act, as opposed to FOIA.  Id.  
 111.  Id. at 977–78. 
 112.  Id. at 978. 
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Other decisions have likewise relied on the de novo nature of judicial 
review under FOIA to reject claims that Chenery should apply.  One court 
explained that: 
Although plaintiff’s assertion [that Chenery precludes the agency 
from raising a new exemption claim in court that was not relied 
on in the administrative denial] may have merit when the court 
engages in limited judicial review under the arbitrary and capri-
cious or substantial evidence standards of the APA, neither the 
cases cited nor the rationale of limited judicial intrusion into 
agency decision-making support the application of that principle 
to de novo determinations of FOIA requests.113 
Another court noted that, “unlike in other administrative-law contexts, 
the [agency’s] failure to consistently assert the applicability of FOIA ex-
emption 6 at the agency level does not bar it from relying on that exemption 
here.”114 
An examination of so-called reverse FOIA cases makes it even more 
apparent that de novo review is the defining feature of FOIA litigation 
courts rely on to preclude the application of Chenery in regular FOIA cases.  
Reverse FOIA cases are cases in which the agency has decided to release 
records in response to a FOIA request, but a third-party sues to prevent dis-
closure to protect their own interest in the records.115  FOIA only allows an 
action to compel disclosure, not to compel secrecy, and thus reverse FOIA 
cases must be brought under the APA.116  Courts review decisions to release 
records challenged in reverse FOIA cases under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard in accordance with the APA.117  Precisely because de novo review 
does not apply to these cases, courts have not hesitated to apply the 
Chenery principle.118  For instance, in one reverse-FOIA suit, the United 
                                                          
 113.  Cook v. Watt, 597 F. Supp. 545, 548 (D. Alaska 1983) (internal citation omitted). Alt-
hough the court relied on exemption 5 of FOIA at the administrative level, only attorney-client 
and deliberative process privileges were cited, rather than the work-product privilege the agency 
later raised in court.  Id. at 547 & n.2.  
 114.  Kalwasinski v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 08 Civ. 9593, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62659, 
at *21 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2010). 
 115.  See CNA Financial Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1133 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting 
that “Reverse-FOIA actions,” in which an information submitter sues to challenge an agency’s 
decision to release records requested under FOIA, are commonplace and are brought under the 
APA). 
 116.  Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317 (1979). 
 117.  United Techs. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 601 F.3d 557, 559 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Canadian 
Commercial Corp. v. Dep’t of Air Force, 514 F.3d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 118.  Data Prompt, Inc. v. Cisneros, No. 94-5133, 1995 WL 225725, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5, 
1995) (“Without deciding whether [the newly invoked regulation] would permit the same decision 
[to disclose the requested records], we reject appellee’s argument as an impermissible post-hoc 
rationalization.  An agency’s administrative decision must stand or fall upon the reasoning ad-
vanced by the agency therein.”); Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 750 F.2d 
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States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed and remanded 
an agency decision to disclose records when the agency’s initial decision 
rested on an out-of-date regulation, even though in litigation the agency 
provided a current regulation that it claimed justified the same result.119  
Thus, when de novo review does not apply, even in the FOIA context, 
Chenery is properly invoked.120  It is not without some irony that Chenery 
constrains agencies’ decisions to release records, increasing the likelihood 
that decisions to promote maximum transparency in line with FOIA’s pur-
pose will be overturned, but not to agency decisions to keep records secret. 
It is tempting to think that the doctrine of waiver in litigation would 
serve to mitigate any unfairness.  Certainly, even though the Chenery prin-
ciple does not apply, courts have acknowledged that the government in a 
FOIA case waives a claim of exemption by failing to timely raise it in the 
course of the judicial proceedings.121  Nonetheless, given its limited appli-
cation and acknowledged exceptions, the waiver doctrine is no substitute 
for Chenery in the FOIA context.122 
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Jordan v. United States Department of 
Justice123 provides a good illustration.  There, the court considered an ex-
emption claim that was not raised by the agency at the administrative level, 
                                                          
1394, 1403–04 (7th Cir. 1984) (“We can give no weight to Messier’s separate affidavit that was 
submitted to the district court. . . .  [W]hile giving reasons why exemption 4 should not be applied, 
the affidavit does not attribute those reasons to the Commission as of the date of its decision.  If 
we relied on it in reviewing that decision, we would be violating the principle of [Chenery].”); 
Jurewicz v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 891 F. Supp. 2d 147, 156 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Chenery in re-
fusing to consider an agency’s potential reliance on discretion to release records where the agency 
articulated the only basis for disclosure that no exemption applied), aff’d, 741 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir 
2014); Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. v. Pena, Civ. A. No. 92-2780-TFH, 1993 WL 786964, at *6 
(D.D.C. Sept. 2, 1993) (applying Chenery to limit inquiry as to whether the agency misapprehend-
ed the law).  
 119.  Data Prompt, 1995 WL 225725, at *2.  
 120.  Not inconsistent with this approach, the Ninth Circuit has also applied a Chenery princi-
ple (without citing Chenery) to litigation over an agency’s refusal to grant a public interest waiver 
of FOIA processing fees.  See Friends of the Coast Fork v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 110 F.3d 53, 
55 (9th Cir. 1997) (“On judicial review, we cannot consider new reasons offered by the agency 
not raised in the denial letter.”).  The Ninth Circuit later distinguished fee waiver determinations 
on the grounds that the statutory review provision limits a court’s inquiry on such determinations 
to “‘the record before the agency.’”  Louis v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 419 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 
2005) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vii)).  This is akin to the Supreme Court’s alternative ra-
tionale for invoking the Chenery rule in Overton Park, relying on the APA provisions requiring 
review on the “whole record” before the agency.  See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 n.30 (1971) (“‘In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall 
review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the 
rule of prejudicial error.’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1964)), abrogated on other grounds by Cali-
fano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
 121.  See infra note 129. 
 122.  See infra notes 129–131. 
 123.  591 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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the district court level, or in the initial court of appeals proceedings, but ra-
ther was relied on for the first time in a petition for rehearing en banc.124  
Citing FOIA’s judicial review provision, the court explained that the gov-
ernment has the burden of proof to establish that an exemption applies, 
thereby requiring the government to specifically state and support each ex-
emption claim in the district court.125  The court concluded that “[a]n agen-
cy cannot prevail on an exemption that it has not raised either at the agency 
level or in the district court and that it has invoked for the first time in the 
appellate court.”126  In a subsequent case, the D.C. Circuit refused to allow 
the government to raise a new claim of exemption for the first time on re-
mand to the district court, explaining that “an agency must identify the spe-
cific statutory exemptions relied upon, and do so at least by the time of the 
district court proceedings.”127  Accordingly, the government’s new claim of 
exemption had been waived.128  Other cases have followed suit, preventing 
new claims of exemption raised after the initial district court proceedings.129 
The waiver doctrine, moreover, is subject to exceptions, resulting in 
courts allowing agencies to raise new arguments even after litigation has 
been ongoing or has reached the appellate court level in certain instances.  
In Jordan, the D.C. Circuit mentioned two possible situations warranting 
reliance on a late-invoked exemption: first, there might be a change in the 
law; and second, there may be an excusable mistake which, if not excused, 
would lead to disclosure of material whose value is “obviously high,” such 
as national security information.130  Thus, the waiver doctrine still allows 
agencies to rely on exemptions not invoked at the agency level so long as 
                                                          
 124.  Id. at 779. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  See, e.g., Am. Immigration Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 905 F.2d 206, 217 
n.2 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting that the agency had waived reliance on a particular exemption when it 
failed to raise it in its Vaughn index and its opening brief, and mentioning it only in a footnote in 
its reply brief).   
 130.  Jordan, 591 F.2d at 780; see also August v. FBI, 328 F.3d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (al-
lowing the government to change its position based on human error and the change in policy that 
resulted); Wash. Post Co. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 795 F.2d 205, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(explaining that Jordan recognized two exceptions to the waiver rule, but finding that neither ap-
plied in the instant case); Hiken v. Dep’t of Def., 872 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940–41 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(allowing the government to change exemption claims based on changes in FOIA law); Judicial 
Watch v. Dep’t of Army, 466 F. Supp. 2d 112, 123–24 (D.D.C. 2006) (allowing an intervenor to 
raise new exemption claims well into the litigation when failure to do so earlier was fault of the 
government); Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 
580–81 (D.D.C. 1987) (finding that the government was allowed to change its exemption claims 
well into the litigation based on changed events). 
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they are raised in the district court level, and it even allows those exemp-
tions to be raised for the first time later in some circumstances.131 
C.  FOIA Litigation Dynamics 
What, then, does the failure to apply Chenery to FOIA cases mean for 
FOIA litigation?  At base, it means that agencies need not adhere to the rea-
sons for having denied the request for records at the outset, or even on ad-
ministrative appeal.  Once an agency is sued in court, the agencies’ lawyers 
can make any arguments for withholding government documents they think 
have the most likelihood of success.  As one judge explained, “litigators . . . 
are blissfully free to advance exemptions never contemplated by the experts 
back home at the agency; the wondrous land of FOIA is a long way from 
Chenery territory.”132 
A review of litigated cases shows that government attorneys take ad-
vantage of the flexibility that comes from not being constrained by 
Chenery.  For example, in one case, an environmental group requested in-
undation maps for areas downstream from the Hoover and Glen Canyon 
dams, including those reflecting flooding that would result from dam fail-
ures.133  The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation denied the request on the sole ba-
sis that the records were exempt from disclosure under FOIA’s exemption 
2, which covers records “‘related solely to the internal personnel rules and 
practices of the agency.’”134  The environmental group sued.  In the district 
court proceedings, the agency maintained its exemption 2 claim, but added 
a claim that withholding these records was also permitted under exemption 
7(F), which exempts records compiled for law enforcement purposes the 
release of which “could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or 
physical safety of any individual.”135  Because Chenery did not apply, the 
                                                          
 131.  See Jordan, 591 F.2d at 780. 
 132.  Wash. Post, Co., 795 F.2d at 210 (Starr, J., dissenting); see also Young v. CIA, 972 F.2d 
536, 538 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[A]n agency does not waive FOIA exemptions by not raising them dur-
ing the administrative process.”). 
 133.  Living Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1314 (D. Utah 
2003).   
 134.  Id. at 1316–1317 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)).  At the time, many circuits had recog-
nized two types of exemption 2 claims, referred to as “high 2” and “low 2” exemptions.  Id. at 
1317.  The government claimed “high 2,” which referred to instances in which not only were the 
records directed internally, but also in which the release of the records would risk circumvention 
of the law.  Id.; see also Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 
1074 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing for the first time the “high 2” exemption).  The “high 2” ex-
emption has subsequently been rejected by the Supreme Court.  See Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 
131 S. Ct. 1259, 1262 (2011).   
 135.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2012); Living Rivers, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1316.  The gov-
ernment also argued that withholding was permitted under exemption 3, which applies to records 
that another statute allows the government to withhold. 
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district court considered the newly raised defense.136  The district court 
concluded that exemption 2 did not cover the inundation maps and rejected 
the government’s claims based thereon.137  The court, however, concluded 
that the government’s withholding was justified by exemption 7(F) because 
of the government’s representations that terrorists might use the maps to 
plot an attack.138  Thus, an exemption that had never been claimed by the 
agency prior to litigation, and which was not particularly related to or rea-
sonably foreseeable from the claims that were made in the administrative 
decision, ended up defeating the requester’s lawsuit in court. 
In another case, a union used FOIA to request payroll reports submit-
ted by a government contractor to the General Services Administration 
(“GSA”).139  The union was seeking to determine if the contractor’s em-
ployees were being paid the wage required by federal law.140  In response to 
the request, the GSA denied access to the reports citing exemption 4, which 
covers confidential commercial and financial records.141  The union admin-
istratively appealed, the GSA again denied on the same basis; and then the 
union brought suit in district court.142  At that point, the GSA asserted that 
the reports could also be withheld under exemption 6, which protects “per-
sonnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”143  Although 
the district court concluded that exemption 4, the trade secrets exemption, 
only justified the withholding of some of the information contained in the 
reports, exemption 6, the personal privacy exemption, which had never 
been raised at the administrative level, justified withholding additional por-
tions of information.144  Thus, it ordered release only of the information not 
covered by either exemption.145 
These are not isolated incidences, but rather, the government routinely 
raises additional claims of exemption for the first time in litigation.146  For 
                                                          
 136.  Living Rivers, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1318. 
 137.  Id.   
 138.  Id. at 1322. 
 139.  Painters Dist. Council #6 v. GSA, No. C85-2971, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31056, at *1 
(N.D. Ohio July 23, 1986). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012) (exempting “trade secrets and commercial or financial 
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”). 
 142.  Painters Dist. Council #6, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31056, at *2. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at *11, *18. 
 145.  Id. at *18–19.  
 146.  See, e.g., Stonehill v. IRS, 558 F.3d 534, 537, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that the IRS 
invoked the deliberative process privilege for the first time in a FOIA district court proceeding, 
not having raised it at the administrative level); Sciba v. Bd. of Governor of Fed. Reserve Sys., 
No. Civ.A. 04-1011, 2005 WL 758260, at *1 n.3 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2005) (allowing the government 
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the requester, the playing field resembles a game of Whac-A-Mole,147 in 
which new claims of exemption keep popping up even as the initial claims 
are defeated.  First, the requester discovers the agency’s initial position in 
the first denial of the request.148  The requester has a chance, at that point, to 
evaluate the strength of the agency’s claim and to decide whether it is worth 
his or her while to administratively appeal the denial.149  If the requester 
thinks that he or she has a decent argument that the claimed exemption to 
disclosure does not apply, he or she will be much more likely to appeal.150  
While there is no fee to appeal within the administrative agency, it certainly 
consumes the requester’s time and energy, and sometimes a requester will 
employ the help of a lawyer.151 
                                                          
to raise four additional exemption claims in court not relied upon in the original denial letter); Kay 
v. FCC, 867 F. Supp. 11, 21–22 (D.D.C. 1994) (allowing the FCC to invoke exemption 7(A) de-
spite failing to do so during the administrative process); Ill. Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 545 F. Supp. 1229, 1235–36 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (finding that exemption defens-
es are not too late if initially raised in the district court). 
 147.  Whac-A-Mole is a popular arcade game invented in the 1970s by Aaron Fechter, compris-
ing an arcade cabinet with five holes, a plastic mole, and a mallet.  The purpose of the game is to 
bash the moles back into their holes by hitting them on the head with the mallet, as they pop up 
randomly.  See Rockafiremovie, The Whac-A-Mole Story, YOUTUBE (Mar. 20, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Agjaa1DyKyA.  The term “whac-a-mole” is used colloquially 
as a metaphor to refer to a futile exercise, including within a variety of legal contexts ranging from 
copyright violations to regulatory action by federal agencies, courts, and Congress.  See Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 47, Riley v. Kennedy, 533 U.S. 406 (2007) (No. 07-77), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-77.pdf (“[T]he purpose of 
section 5 [of the Voting Rights Act] . . . was to prevent a sort of game of Whac-A-Mole in which 
the States would keep changing the practice.  And the idea of that freeze was to hold it in place so 
that it could be challenged as a constitutional matter before the State switched again.”); A. Bryan 
Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, United States Food Law Update: The FDA Food Safety Moderni-
zation Act, Obesity and Deceptive Labeling Enforcement, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 135, 155 (2011) 
(“[T]he issue of acai berry weight-loss supplements illustrates the regulatory game of Whac-a-
Mole that often plays out in enforcement actions against online sellers: shut one website down, 
and another immediately pops up somewhere else.”); Brad A. Greenberg, More than Just a For-
mality: Instant Authorship and Copyright’s Opt-Out Future in the Digital Age, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
1028, 1052 (2012) (“[A]s Douglas Lichtman has said, that default forces copyright holders to play 
Whac-A-Mole—searching for and knocking down infringing content like springing moles in the 
popular arcade game—while permitting YouTube to get rich selling ads on the same infringing 
content.”). 
 148.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012) (requiring the government to “notify the person 
making such request of such determination and the reasons therefore”). 
 149.  See Kristin Adair & Catherine Nielsen, Effective FOIA Requesting for Everyone: A Na-
tional Security Archive Guide, NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE, 30 (Jan. 29, 2009), 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foia/foia_guide/foia_guide_full.pdf (discussing the litigation 
process of administrative requests). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  See id. (noting that hiring an attorney may make an impact if the litigant is not familiar 
with case law and court procedures); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii) (providing for adminis-
trative appeals). 
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As is the case with respect to other types of agency decisions, once 
administratively appealed, the requester could discover that the agency has 
a new position concerning why it will not release the records.152  Perhaps it 
has abandoned its initial position entirely or just added an additional 
claimed basis for withholding.  Either way, the requester likely had no way 
of anticipating this new claim.  Thus, any arguments the requester might 
have made to counter the new claim are not going to be considered by the 
agency in the first instance.  If the new claim is strong, the requester may 
have wasted his or her time—as well as the agency’s time—by administra-
tively appealing the decision.  If the new claim is weak, the requester is 
now at the stage where the next remedy is available only by suing in district 
court, and the requester cannot take advantage of the comparatively simple 
and efficient administrative appeals process to bring the agency’s error to 
its attention.153 
Filing a lawsuit in court, of course, is no minor inconvenience.  In ad-
dition to a substantial filing fee,154 the assistance of a lawyer is often critical 
to any meaningful chance of success.155  Once in litigation, the costs only 
escalate because effective FOIA litigation requires not only filing pleadings, 
but typically also litigation over Vaughn indices—the specialized affidavits 
used by the government to justify withholdings in FOIA cases156—and 
summary judgment motions.157  Even a pro se litigant must dedicate sub-
stantial time to preparing and filing courts papers, far more than making an 
initial request or even filing an administrative appeal.158  Unlike other cases 
                                                          
 152.  See, e.g., Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting 
that the U.S. Postal Service denied a FOIA request citing two exemptions, and denied the adminis-
trative appeal citing a third); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. NIH Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., 853 F. Supp. 2d 146, 150 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that, after PETA filed a timely 
administrative appeal, the agency issued a final decision in which it explained for the first time the 
basis of its withholdings under certain FOIA exemptions). 
 153.  5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(B).  Although a requester has exhausted administrative remedies by 
filing an administrative appeal, there is nothing precluding an agency from considering a request 
for reconsideration of an appeal denial.  See Lakin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 917 F. Supp. 2d 142, 
143 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting that after the Office of Information Policy closed the appeal, plaintiff 
requested that denial of his appeal be reconsidered, which the agency denied before filing suit in 
district court). 
 154.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2013) (fixing the filing fee for a civil action at $350). 
 155.  See Adair & Nielsen, supra note 149, at 52 (explaining the benefits of a lawyer in FOIA 
litigation); see generally Stephen Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 439 (2009) (analyzing the major problems facing pro se litigants and 
noting low success rates of cases brought by pro se plaintiffs). 
 156.  The Vaughn index is so named after a D.C. Circuit case establishing the procedure, 
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 157.  See Kwoka, supra note 21, at 227 (stating that summary judgment is the presumptive 
method for resolving a FOIA case). 
 158.  See Adair & Nielsen, supra note 149, at 52–53 (detailing the FOIA litigation process and 
the considerations in bringing a lawsuit). 
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of administrative review where Chenery applies, however, at this time the 
game of Whac-A-Mole may continue.  It may be only at the point of getting 
the government’s affidavits or summary judgment motion that the requester 
discovers the agency has yet another claim of exemption or argument for 
withholding.159  Again, perhaps the new claim is more meritorious or at 
least more difficult for the requester to defeat, and if the requester had this 
information, it might have impacted the requester’s litigation strategy or 
even the decision to sue.  Moreover, if the new claim is weak and can be de-
feated, both the agency and requester may have already wasted litigation 
resources on earlier claims, only to now face the crux of the issues in the 
case.  In some cases, the requester’s limited resources may even be exhaust-
ed trying to defeat successive agency claims of exemption, leading to an 
undeserved agency victory.160 
The agency’s change of position is made worse because, for several 
reasons, a requester will rarely be able to anticipate whether there is another 
potentially meritorious exemption claim that might arise.  First, often the 
requester is not in a position to know much about the contents of the rec-
ords.161  As the examples above illustrate, the claims of exemption are often 
made on very different grounds.  In one case, personal privacy claims were 
made after the fact when the initial claim was about commercial infor-
mation.162  In another, a claim regarding law enforcement concerns was 
raised after the initial exemption cited pertained to internally directed agen-
cy documents.163 
                                                          
 159.  See, e.g., Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. FCC, 505 F. Supp. 2d 106, 113 (D.D.C. 2007)  (find-
ing without merit plaintiff’s argument that because the FCC raised an exemption claim in its 
summary judgment papers, rather than in its initial responsive pleading, that it was waived); De-
fendant’s Consolidated Reply in Support of Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff’s 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Hodes v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 532 F. 
Supp. 2d 108 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 07-0161-CKK) (stating that defendant did not cite exemption 3 
in its FOIA response letter, nor when upholding denial of plaintiff’s FOIA request, but only in its 
motion for summary judgment).  
 160.  Although attorneys’ fees are available to FOIA plaintiffs who substantially prevail at the 
discretion of the district court, judicial gloss on this provision has made winning fees an uphill 
battle for plaintiffs.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (2012) (“The court may assess against the 
United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case 
under this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.”); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. 
FBI, 522 F.3d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining that plaintiff must demonstrate both eligibil-
ity for fees and entitlement to them under a four factor test).  As such, and given the improbability 
of prevailing, attorneys’ fees alone often are not enough of an incentive for the plaintiff and attor-
ney to proceed. 
 161.  The court, however, always has the option of reviewing sensitive documents in camera.  
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
 162.  Painters Dist. Council #6 v. GSA, No. C85-2971, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31056, at *2 
(N.D. Ohio July 23, 1986). 
 163.  Living Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1316 (D. Utah 
2003). 
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Second, even though there are only nine enumerated exemptions to 
disclosure under FOIA,164 FOIA’s exemption 3 covers records “specifically 
exempted from disclosure by [another] statute,” so long as that other statute 
meets certain criteria.165  What those other statutes are is not only unknown 
to the requester, but often, unknowable.  The DOJ has compiled a list of 
statutes that qualify as exemption 3 statutes, which contains sixty-eight such 
statutory provisions, ranging from statutes as specific as one covering cer-
tain information obtained by the National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program to those as general as certain Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.166  Moreover, as the DOJ explains in its report, the list does not in-
clude “any statute which has not yet been considered by a court as a possi-
ble Exemption 3 statute,” meaning there are an indeterminate number of 
possible statutes that an agency might claim qualify as exemption 3 statutes, 
but which have not yet been the subject of litigation.167  Complicating the 
situation, some of the statutes that are included on the list have “been found 
to qualify under Exemption 3 by one court and found not to qualify by an-
other.”168  A requester cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate all pos-
sible exemption 3 claims, or to evaluate whether a statute even qualifies as 
an exemption 3 statute where no court has ruled or where even courts can-
not agree.169 
Finally, even when a record falls within an exemption to disclosure 
under FOIA, the government often retains the power to release the record as 
a matter of discretion.170  Given that fact, an agency’s failure to assert even 
an obvious exemption could easily, and justifiably, be interpreted as the 
                                                          
 164.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
 165.  Id. § 552(b)(3).  In full, exemption 3 states that FOIA does not apply to records that are:  
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this ti-
tle), if that statute—(A)(i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such 
a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or (ii) establishes particular criteria for 
withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; and (B) if enacted af-
ter the date of enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, specifically cites to this par-
agraph. 
Id. 
 166.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATUTES FOUND TO QUALIFY UNDER EXEMPTION 3 OF FOIA 
(2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/exemption3.pdf.  
 167.  Id. at 1. 
 168.  Id.   
 169.  See id. (listing numerous statutes that qualify as possible exemption 3 claims). 
 170.  See Nate Jones, Document Friday: Cheat Sheet for Discretionary FOIA Releases, NAT’L 
SECURITY ARCHIVE (Mar. 18, 2011) http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2011/03/18/document-
friday-cheat-sheet-for-discretionary-foia-releases/  (displaying a Department of Interior memo 
asserting that four of the nine exemptions are eligible for discretionary release); see also Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 879 F.2d 698, 700 (9th Cir. 1989) (summarizing the law under FOIA concern-
ing when agencies’ prior disclosure of records waives the right to claim exemption from disclo-
sure). 
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agency’s discretionary decision not to invoke it.171  With little to no way of 
predicting what an agency may later bring up as an alternative grounds for 
withholding records, requesters are in the very difficult position of having 
to evaluate the value of pursuing additional remedies under FOIA without 
being able to even guess at the likelihood of success.172 
This aspect of FOIA litigation is not only frustrating for the requester, 
it also risks wasted agency resources.  While at first blush it may seem to 
save the agency time in not having to state all alternative bases for with-
holding in the initial denial, there remain potential unaccounted for costs.173  
For instance, as described above, not asserting all rationales the agency may 
ultimately rely on could lead requesters to believe they have a better chance 
than they really do on administrative appeal or by filing a lawsuit, and thus 
could encourage more appeals and litigation against the agency.174  In addi-
tion, if an agency does not assert a particular exemption or argument until 
litigation has commenced, it did not receive the benefit of any counterar-
guments the requester might have made at the administrative level, which 
could have persuaded the agency to come to a different conclusion and pre-
vented the lawsuit in the first place. 
D.  Conclusion 
As FOIA litigation currently stands, the agencies, in effect, have their 
cake and eat it too: they enjoy deferential treatment for their positions by 
the courts, and they are not constrained in what positions they may take that 
will receive this privileged treatment.175  An agency—or more to the point 
its lawyers, who usually do not work within the agency—can come up with 
any rationale for its past actions withholding records and those rationales 
will be treated deferentially by the courts.176  In nearly every other context 
                                                          
 171.  See David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of 
Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1789 (2008) (arguing that the FOIA process 
as currently structured invites further disputes because of agency delay and lack of specificity in 
response). 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id.  
 174.  Id. 
 175.  See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 
1021 (2007) (describing Chenery as a “constraint [that] polices the conditions for judicial defer-
ence to agency action”).  One scholar has made the flip side of this argument: that Chenery has 
been used, at least in one context, as a way of avoiding the deference actually owed.  See Matthew 
Ginsburg, “A Nigh Endless Game of Battledore and Shuttlecock”: The D.C. Circuit’s Misuse of 
Chenery Remands in NLRB Cases, 86 NEB. L. REV. 595, 609 (2008) (suggesting “that the D.C. 
Circuit is using Chenery to avoid extending the deference it owes to the [NLRB]”).  In the FOIA 
context, Chenery could be used to cabin the deference currently extended but not owed to the 
agencies’ positions. 
 176.  See Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE 
L.J. 1032, 1043 (2011) (stating that under a rule that allows post hoc rationalizations, lawyers 
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in which courts defer to agency actions, Chenery constrains the court’s abil-
ity to defer by dictating the position the court must consider: only that 
which was articulated at the time the decision was made.177  The deference 
in FOIA litigation, unconstrained by Chenery, distorts the proceedings such 
that agencies are at an even greater advantage under the purportedly de no-
vo review of FOIA litigation than when other types of actions are chal-
lenged and reviewed deferentially.178  Under this regime, FOIA decisions 
are affirmed at a shockingly high rate, a pattern that flips FOIA’s maximum 
transparency goal on its head.179 
II.  RELOCATING FOIA IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Documenting the judicial deference that produces a striking ninety 
percent affirmance rate in FOIA cases180 undermines any claim that courts 
engage in true de novo review of FOIA cases.  As I have argued elsewhere, 
strategies exist by which Congress, courts, and litigants all could work to-
ward correcting the standard of review in FOIA cases and restoring true de 
novo judicial review of agency decisions to withhold records from the pub-
lic.181  Realistically, however, it is imperative to acknowledge that these 
strategies may have limited success.  Congress tried course-correction in 
this area once before without managing to truly reverse the deference trends 
in the courts;182 courts and litigants, for their part, are accustomed to FOIA 
litigation as it typically proceeds and revisiting old precedents is not a prior-
ity.183 
Perhaps even more of a barrier to restoring true de novo review is an 
intangible sentiment that Congress has asked the courts to perform a func-
tion the courts feel neither qualified nor comfortable performing: second-
guessing agencies’ factual representations in areas traditionally in the pur-
view of the executive branch, such as national security.184  Moreover, over-
burdened courts have little patience for the type of page-by-page, or even 
                                                          
formulate reasons that are presented to the court and that can be completely different from what 
was proffered by the agency). 
 177.  Id. at 1042. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  See Verkuil, supra note 12, at 713 (reporting a ninety percent affirmance rate in FOIA 
cases). 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Kwoka, supra note 21, at 239–42. 
 182.  Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)); see 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).  
 183.  See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 184.  See Patricia M. Wald, Two Unsolved Constitutional Problems, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 753, 
760–61 (1988) (“Probing even a little into national security matters [in a FOIA case] is not an easy 
or a pleasant job.”).  
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line-by-line, review of records in camera that FOIA permits (but does not 
require) them to perform.185  It has been suggested that courts view FOIA 
generally as having questionable value.186 
If courts are unable or unwilling to enforce FOIA rights the way Con-
gress envisioned, it poses a separation of powers problem in which the 
courts are failing to respect a co-equal branch’s legitimate exercise of its 
constitutional powers to legislate.187  It is not, however, a problem that is 
easily solved by simply pointing out that judges should perform a function 
they feel ill-equipped to perform or about which they may be acting on un-
conscious beliefs about the merits of FOIA as a transparency tool.188  In-
deed, while FOIA jurisprudence has gone awry, much of its deviation from 
the norm arose from judges trying to improve FOIA litigation as a check on 
agencies, not to diminish it.189  While a true de novo regime might be opti-
mal, in many ways, FOIA’s almost fifty-year experiment with de novo re-
view has simply failed. 
As a result, other solutions should be explored, particularly with the 
goal of cabining the overwhelming deference in FOIA cases.190  Chenery 
                                                          
 185.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (authorizing in camera review); see also Fuchs, supra note 67, at 
173 (showing that in camera inspection has “fallen into disfavor in recent years”). 
 186.  See Verkuil, supra note 12, at 715–16 (citing courts’ “skepticism,” if not “resistance,” 
toward FOIA). 
 187.  Kwoka, supra note 21, at 235. 
 188.  As David Dyzenhaus has argued, in cases where the judiciary may feel ill-equipped to 
rule, “rather than find what the executive does is beyond the reach of law, judges will find that, 
given the situation, they should, as a matter of law, defer to the executive’s judgment about what 
is required.”  DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF 
EMERGENCY 19 (2006).  Dyzenhaus describes the resulting review as a legal “grey hole,” defined 
as “a legal space in which there are some legal constraints on executive action—it is not a lawless 
void—but the constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it 
pleases.”  Id. at 42.  Dyzenhaus claims that “grey holes cause more harm to the rule of law than 
black holes [which represents an absence of judicial review, because] . . . the procedural rights 
available to the detainee cloak the lack of substance.”  Id. at 50.  This describes the current state of 
play in review of FOIA decisions, in which procedural rights mask the lack of meaningful review, 
and the rule of law would be better served by honestly describing the standard of review judges 
can actually employ.   
 189.  The Vaughn index is a prime example of a tool judges believed would help the requester, 
but which has turned out to tilt the playing field even farther in favor of the agency.  See supra 
note 82 and accompanying text. 
 190.  My approach is consistent with an economic theory of “second best optimum”: 
[I]f there is introduced into a general equilibrium system a constraint which prevents 
the attainment of one of the Paretian [optimal] conditions, the other Paretian [optimal] 
conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer desirable.  In other words, 
given that one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, then an optimum 
situation can be achieved only by departing from all the other Paretian [optimal] condi-
tions.  The optimum situation finally attained may be termed a second best optimum 
because it is achieved subject to a constraint which, by definition, prevents the attain-
ment of a Paretian optimum.   
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offers a solution in this regard.191  Reconceptualizing FOIA litigation as not 
an exception to basic administrative law principles, but rather subject to 
both the deference to and constraints on agencies in typical administrative 
litigation, would acknowledge the reality of deference in FOIA litigation 
and cabin its effects.192  Chenery’s use in FOIA litigation, however, must be 
doctrinally and theoretically justified.  When the reality of FOIA litiga-
tion—rather than the formal standards—is considered, the theories underly-
ing Chenery, its practical operation, and the statutory scheme under FOIA 
all support its application. 
A.  The Chenery Principle 
The origins of the Chenery principle are not entirely clear: while some 
ascribe constitutional dimensions to Chenery, others see it as part and par-
cel with statutory mandates, and still others understand Chenery as allocat-
                                                          
R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 
11 (1956).  Other scholars have applied this theory in the judicial context.  See, e.g., Justin Pidot, 
Jurisdictional Procedure, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 29 & n.120 (2012) (demonstrating that, in 
the absence of true checks and balances, courts use a second-best approach to check their own 
power in ascertaining their jurisdiction to hear a case).  As to FOIA litigation, the optimum might 
be true de novo review, without the application of the Chenery principle.  Given that the optimal 
condition of de novo review is constrained by courts’ ability to realistically second-guess certain 
agency representations and deference is thus used in practice, the “second best optimum” is not 
achieved by retaining the other condition of the optimum: inapplicability of Chenery.  This Article 
contends that the second best optimum is achieved by departing from the condition of Chenery’s 
inapplicability as well and instead looking at FOIA litigation under the paradigm of typical admin-
istrative law litigation.  
 191.  It is, by no means, the only solution to the problems posed in FOIA litigation.  See, e.g., 
Danae J. Aitchison, Comment, Reining in the Glomar Response: Reducing CIA Abuse of the 
Freedom of Information Act, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 219, 249–51 (1993) (suggesting that Con-
gress should provide the courts with more explicit power to evaluate so-called Glomar responses 
in FOIA cases, in which the government refuses to admit or deny the existence of responsive rec-
ords); Nathan Slegers, Comment, De Novo Review Under the Freedom of Information Act: The 
Case Against Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions to Withhold Information, 43 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 209, 235 (2006) (proposing that FOIA decisions could be moved closer to de novo review 
either by mandatory in camera review or through the use of plaintiffs’ experts or court appointed 
independent experts).  
 192.  The idea of the “second best” in the administrative law context has also been theorized.  
See Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a 
Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (1994).  McCutchen contends 
that the administrative state is inherently inconsistent with the separation of powers principles in 
the Constitution, and argues that the Supreme Court should tolerate unconstitutional structures that 
are institutionalized but should also allow the creation of compensating institutions that move the 
balance of powers closer toward the constitutional optimum.  Id. at 2–3, 11, 22.  In short, the theo-
ries of second best solutions accept the initial “wrong,” in this case deference to agencies in FOIA 
litigation, and look for a compensating or countervailing change in the state of play that will move 
the state of play closer to the ideal, even if the compensation itself is of questionable permissibil-
ity.   
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ing power among agency actors.193  In every account of Chenery, however, 
there is an inherent and uncontroverted link between the application of the 
Chenery principle and the deference courts owe to an agency’s position.194  
Not only are deference and Chenery linked, but, as this section will demon-
strate, Chenery operates as a necessary and justified constraint on the defer-
ence the judiciary gives to the administrative state.195 
1.  Origins 
The Chenery principle was announced in 1943 in Securities and Ex-
change Commission v. Chenery Corp. (“Chenery” or “Chenery I”).196  The 
dispute in Chenery arose under the Public Utility Holding Company Act 
(“PUHCA”), which required reorganization of public utility companies to 
be approved by the SEC.197  The SEC denied approval of a particular plan 
because it permitted officers and directors of the company to execute trades 
on the company’s securities during reorganization.198  The SEC reasoned 
that such trades would violate the fiduciary duties of the officers and direc-
tors.199  Reviewing this order, the Supreme Court concluded that the SEC 
wrongly found a fiduciary violation in the stock purchases since the pur-
chases were not based on insider trading, preferential treatment, or secret 
dealings.200 
The Court refused, however, to consider the SEC’s alternative ra-
tionale, advanced for the first time in litigation, that even if there were no 
breach of fiduciary duty, the SEC had the discretionary power under the 
PUHCA to find a reorganization plan that permitted fiduciaries to trade in 
the company’s stock either contrary to the public interest or not fair and eq-
uitable as required under PUHCA.201  The Court explained that “[t]he 
grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon 
which the record discloses that its action was based.”202  Since the rationale 
                                                          
 193.  See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417, 419 (1971) (relying 
in part on language from APA to justify the Chenery principle), abrogated on other grounds by 
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1043 (arguing 
that Chenery’s effect is to reallocate power horizontally within agencies); Stack, supra note 175, 
at 982 (arguing that Chenery is an arm of the nondelegation doctrine). 
 194.  See infra Part III.A.2. 
 195.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 196.  318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). 
 197.  Id. at 82. 
 198.  Id. at 85. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at 85–86, 93. 
 201.  Id. at 90.  
 202.  Id. at 87.  
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on which the SEC had relied was based on legal error, the Supreme Court 
reversed.203 
Because Chenery concerned an agency adjudication with the hallmarks 
of formality and predated the APA, the principle announced might have 
been applied in limited circumstances or abandoned entirely.  Indeed, the 
APA’s clearly delineated distinction between formal and informal proceed-
ings,204 and between adjudications and rulemakings,205 seemed ready-made 
for, at a minimum, a judicial review doctrine constrained to formal adjudi-
cations.  Instead, the Chenery principle has grown in scope and is now held 
to apply to agency actions in almost every context.206  In Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park v. Volpe,207 the Supreme Court extended the Chenery 
principle to informal adjudications such as the Secretary of Transportation’s 
decision to permit construction of a federally-funded highway through a 
park because there lacked a feasible alternative.208  In Overton Park, the 
Court cited Chenery for the principle that affidavits created during the liti-
gation were “post hoc rationalizations” not entitled to consideration.209  The 
Court explained that relying on such affidavits would also violate the judi-
cial review provision of the APA, which requires the court to review “the 
whole record.”210  The Court concluded that the affidavits were not part of 
the “whole record,” which the APA required to be the basis for review.211  
In effect, the Court, without much explanation, located the Chenery princi-
ple in the APA and extended it to constrain judicial review of both formal 
and informal adjudications.212 
The Court has also extended the Chenery principle to the review of 
rulemakings.  Informal rulemaking is the default procedure for the creation 
of binding, legislative rules, and is known more commonly as notice-and-
                                                          
 203.  Id. at 95.  
 204.  See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (enumerating the now-familiar notice and comment proce-
dures for what are known as informal rulemakings, but requiring the more formal procedures in 
Sections 556 and 557 in those rulemakings specified to be made after a hearing on the record); id. 
§ 554 (applying this section, and by reference, the formal procedures provided for in Sections 556 
and 557, to those adjudications required to be decided after a hearing on the record, thereby dis-
tinguishing between formal and informal adjudications). 
 205.  Id. § 551(4) (providing a definition of a “rule”); id. § 551(6), (7) (defining an “order” as 
the result of an adjudication, and encompassing everything other than a “rule”). 
 206.  Stack, supra note 175, at 956. 
 207.  401 U.S. 402 (1971), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 
(1977). 
 208.  Id. at 417.  
 209.  Id. at 419 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 210.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“In making the foregoing deter-
minations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due 
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”).  
 211.  Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 212.  Id. 
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comment rulemaking.  In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers of the United 
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,213 the Supreme 
Court considered the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s no-
tice-and-comment rule repealing a requirement that all new cars have a pas-
sive restraint system consisting either of automatic seat belts or of air 
bags.214  The Court described the appropriate review of notice-and-
comment rules as what has now been dubbed “hard look”215 review, a series 
of inquiries the Court found rooted in the formal arbitrary and capricious 
standard.216  Under hard look review, a court must assure itself that an 
agency’s position has not, 
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, of-
fered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evi-
dence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency exper-
tise.217 
Importantly, the Court, immediately after articulating this list, announced 
that the Chenery principle applies: “The reviewing court should not attempt 
itself to make up for such deficiencies [by] . . . supply[ing] a reasoned basis 
for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.”218 
The State Farm decision even had the occasion to apply Chenery in 
the rulemaking context.219  One ground on which the Court found the agen-
cy’s analysis lacking was that, while it documented the problems associated 
with automatic seatbelts, it failed to consider the obvious alternative to re-
pealing the rule entirely, which was to require airbags in all vehicles.220  
Because the agency had not considered that option, there were no reasons 
and no rationale in the record for rejecting it, and the Court accordingly re-
fused to consider the agency’s explanation proffered during litigation.221 
2.  Link to Deference 
Thus established, the Chenery principle requires courts in a wide va-
riety of cases reviewing agency actions to limit their inquiry to the permis-
                                                          
 213.  463 U.S. 29 (1983).   
 214.  Id. at 38.   
 215.  See Note, Rationalizing Hard Look Review After the Fact, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1909, 
1912–19 (2009) (describing the modern hard look doctrine as “best encapsulated” in State Farm). 
 216.  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42–43.  
 217.  Id. at 43. 
 218.  Id.  
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. at 49. 
 221.  Id. at 50.  
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sibility of the agency’s contemporaneous rationale for the decision.  But, 
from where did this principle come?  After all, appellate courts are general-
ly free to affirm district court orders on any grounds apparent in the record, 
even if not relied upon or even ruled on by the district court.222  When 
courts review acts of Congress, Congress is not required to explain itself 
and legislation typically must be upheld unless there is no permissible basis 
for it.223  In this sense, then, administrative law is unique: only in the agen-
cy context do courts require the governmental action under review to stand 
or fall based on the reasoning provided at the time the decision was 
made.224 
The Chenery Court suggested that this administrative exceptionalism 
arises from the constitutional separation of powers principles.225  In 
Chenery, the Court explained that it was not up to the judiciary to decide 
what is contrary to the public interest or what is fair and equitable under the 
PUHCA.226  Rather, the Court said, the agency must actually exercise its 
power, granted by Congress, to make such a determination.227  To supplant 
reasons or rely on rationales not provided by the agency itself when it made 
the decision would, in effect, be overreaching on the part of the judiciary.228  
In fact, judicially provided rationales may not be rationales the agency 
would have actually adopted, thereby thwarting the outcome the agency 
would have reached.  For this reason, “[i]ts action must be measured by 
what the [agency] did, not by what it might have done.”229 
After the Chenery Court reversed the agency’s denial of approval of 
the reorganization plan, it remanded the case back to the agency for further 
consideration.230  The agency, in turn, reconsidered the original matter and 
again rejected the proposed reorganization plan, but this time on a different 
rationale.231  The new decision was again challenged, and the case again 
                                                          
 222.  See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937) (“In the review of judicial proceed-
ings the rule is settled that, if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower 
court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.”); Stack, supra note 175, at 955 (noting 
this general rule).  But see Richard Murphy, Chenery Unmasked: Reasonable Limits on the Duty 
to Give Reasons, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 826 (2012) (documenting instances where lower courts’ 
failure to provide adequate reasoning to support discretionary decisions results in reversal).   
 223.  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594–96 (2012) (up-
holding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act on the rationale that it was an exercise of 
Congress’s power to tax, even though Congress justified the legislation on the Commerce Clause); 
see also Stack, supra note 175, at 955 (contrasting this principle to administrative law rules).   
 224.  Stack, supra note 175, at 955–56. 
 225.  SEC v. Chenery (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). 
 226.  Id.  
 227.  Id.  
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. at 93–94. 
 230.  Id. at 95. 
 231.  SEC v. Chenery (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). 
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reached the Supreme Court (Chenery II).232  This time the Supreme Court 
began by rearticulating the Chenery principle, calling it a “fundamental rule 
of administrative law,” and warning that a court is “powerless” to affirm an 
agency action on a basis other than that which was stated by the agency at 
the time.233  Further, the Court noted that “[t]o do so would propel the court 
into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the adminis-
trative agency.”234  The agency’s new rationale, the Court concluded, was 
adequate to sustain the agency’s decision and the Court therefore affirmed 
the denial of plan approval.235 
The explanations of the Chenery principle in Chenery I and Chenery II 
point to a separation of powers rationale, limiting the power of the judiciary 
when Congress has delegated the relevant authority exclusively to the exec-
utive branch.236  This rationale has been rearticulated at various times by 
courts and scholars alike.237  The Supreme Court’s somewhat cursory ex-
planation of the rationale behind the Chenery principle is, however, hardly a 
full accounting of the rule’s relationship to other administrative law doc-
trines or to the constitutional foundations of agency authority.  Indeed, Kev-
in Stack notes that despite the fact that Chenery remains one of the most 
common grounds for reversal of agency actions, there is a “curious uncer-
tainty concerning its basis.”238  The separation of powers rationale itself is 
also somewhat unsatisfying, if not at times downright counterintuitive; it is, 
after all, a bit ironic to claim courts are more respectful of an agency’s spe-
cial role mandated by Congress when they overturn the agency’s action 
than when they uphold it.239 
As discussed below, other justifications for Chenery have been theo-
rized, including one based on the nondelegation doctrine and another based 
                                                          
 232.  Id.  
 233.  Id.  
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id. at 209.   
 236.  Id. at 207; SEC v. Chenery (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943). 
 237.  See, e.g., Global Van Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 714 F.2d 1290, 1298–99 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(noting that “Chenery I was based upon the proposition that a ‘determination of policy or judg-
ment’ that Congress had entrusted to an agency could not be exercised in the first instance by a 
court”); Time, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 667 F.2d 329, 334–35 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that Chenery 
II explained the purpose of the Chenery principle as avoiding “propel[ling] the court into the do-
main which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency”); Ronald M. Levin, 
“Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE 
L.J. 291, 367–68 (2003) (noting that “[a]lthough one usually thinks of the doctrine as a limitation 
on the circumstances in which an agency action can be upheld, one of its corollaries is that, as a 
general rule, a court also may not reject an agency action by making its own determinations on an 
issue that lies within the agency’s discretionary authority”). 
 238.  Stack, supra note 175, at 957. 
 239.  See Murphy, supra note 222, at 846 (labeling as counterintuitive the Chenery Court’s 
claim that upholding the Commission order would infringe on the Commission’s authority). 
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on allocating power within the agency.240  In the end, these justifications are 
highly related to one another, and, most importantly for the purposes of 
Chenery’s relationship to FOIA, each justification links Chenery’s applica-
tion to judicial deference to agencies.  To be sure, these justifications link 
Chenery specifically to Chevron deference, a type of deference not invoked 
in FOIA cases.  As described below, however, the rationale linking Chenery 
to Chevron deference can be applied by analogy to link Chenery to the ob-
served deference in FOIA cases as a practical reality, even if not as a formal 
undertaking. 
The relationship between deference and the Chenery doctrine is 
longstanding, and can be found even in the separation of powers rationale 
articulated by the Supreme Court in the Chenery cases themselves.241  In 
Chenery II, the Court explained that the Chenery principle applies when a 
court is “dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative 
agency alone is authorized to make.”242  This is an important limitation on 
Chenery’s reach and is, of course, also essentially the same condition nec-
essary for courts to defer to an agency’s legal interpretation of an ambigu-
ous statutory provision under Chevron.243  Thus, where Chenery does not 
apply, Chevron likewise does not come into play.244  For example, neither 
the Chenery principle nor Chevron deference is invoked when courts review 
agency interpretations of the APA,245 the National Environmental Policy 
Act,246 the Privacy Act,247 or, relevant here, FOIA.248  The reason for these 
types of exemptions is that these are statutes Congress has not delegated to 
any particular agency to administer.249 
                                                          
 240.  See infra notes 250–269 and accompanying text. 
 241.  Chenery II, 332 U.S., at 207 (deferring to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
conclusion disapproving of a federal water company’s reorganization since the Commission made 
“an informed, expert judgment on the problem”).  
 242.  Id. at 196. 
 243.  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984) (explaining that when a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, the 
court must defer to the agency’s answer to that issue when it is based upon a permissible construc-
tion of the statute). 
 244.  Although there is a large overlap in the conditions for applying Chenery and Chevron, the 
overlap is not complete.  For a detailed account of some differences at the margins and cases in 
which only one or the other doctrine applies, see Stack, supra note 175, at 1010–13. 
 245.  See Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 758 F.2d 1052, 1059–60 (5th Cir. 1985) (declin-
ing to apply the Chenery principle to the agency’s interpretation of the APA requirements).  
 246.  See Olmstead Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. United States, 793 F.2d 201, 208 n.9 (8th 
Cir. 1986) (declining to apply the Chenery principle to the agency’s interpretation of NEPA).   
 247.  See Louis v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 419 F.3d 970, 977–78 (9th Cir. 2005) (declining to ap-
ply the Chenery principle to the agency’s interpretation of the Privacy Act). 
 248.  See supra Part II.B (discussing courts’ rationales for not applying the Chenery principle 
to withholding decisions under FOIA).  
 249.  Stack, supra note 175, at 965–66.  
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Stack provided a compelling constitutional account of this connection 
between Chenery and Chevron in his argument that Chenery is rooted in the 
nondelegation doctrine.250  According to the nondelegation doctrine, Con-
gress may not delegate away its legislative power, which is vested to it by 
the Constitution.251  Modern nondelegation cases articulate the requirement 
that when Congress delegates power to the agencies, it must provide an “in-
telligible principle” to guide the agencies and by which courts may measure 
agencies’ actions on review.252  So long as Congress supplies such an intel-
ligible principle, the delegation does not give away Congress’s essential 
legislative power because Congress, not the agency, has made the critical 
policy choice.253 
Stack’s review of Chenery’s roots, however, was premised on a more 
nuanced understanding of the nondelegation doctrine.  According to his ac-
count, Chenery is based in early nondelegation cases that articulated the 
nondelegation doctrine not as a single requirement, but in two parts: first, 
that Congress set the standard to guide agency action (the origins of the in-
telligible principle requirement); and second, that an agency expressly state 
the basis for its action (the origins, according to Stack, of the Chenery prin-
ciple).254  This two-part articulation reflected a “‘contingency’ theory” of 
nondelegation, which, Stack explained, allowed delegations to the executive 
branch only when the power to take a particular action was conditioned on 
the occurrence of some “named contingency,” and the executive branch ex-
pressly found that such contingency was met.255  Stack illustrated the con-
tingency theory of nondelegation with an early case in which the executive 
branch deported an individual without making a finding that the person was 
an “undesirable” resident, even though the statute allowed the executive 
branch to deport only “undesirable residents of the United States.”256  Ab-
sent a finding of the condition—the undesirability of the resident—the ex-
ecutive branch had acted outside its delegated authority and thus unconsti-
                                                          
 250.  Id. at 1007 (arguing that “[t]he nondelegation account of Chenery helps to explain why 
the demand for reasoned decision-making is part and parcel of the reasonableness inquiry at Chev-
ron Step Two”).  The nondelegation doctrine stems from the vesting clause in Article I, which 
vests all “legislative [p]owers” in Congress.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; see Whitman v. Am. Truck-
ing Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (explaining the constitutional dimensions of the nondelega-
tion doctrine). 
 251.  Stack, supra note 175, at 982. 
 252.  Id. at 958 (quoting J.W. Hampton Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).  
 253.  See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting that Congress may wish to legislate in an area it had not previ-
ously sought to enter because “[i]t is the hard choices, and not the filling in of the blanks, which 
must be made by the elected representatives of the people”).   
 254.  Stack, supra note 175, at 982.  
 255.  Id. at 983 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 256.  Id. at 985 (quoting Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 40 (1924)).   
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tutionally.257  Subsequent early cases reaffirmed that an executive finding 
concerning a necessary condition for taking action was constitutionally re-
quired.258 
Stack’s account not only links the Chenery principle to nondelegation, 
but also to judicial deference to agency actions, most importantly Chevron 
deference.259  Under Chevron, a court must defer to an agency interpretation 
of a statute the agency is charged with administering when the agency is in-
terpreting an ambiguous provision and the agency’s interpretation is rea-
sonable.260  The first part of the inquiry, whether the statutory provision is 
ambiguous or clear, is known as Chevron “Step One,” while determining 
the reasonableness of the agency interpretation is known as “Step Two.”261  
According to courts, Chevron deference is warranted when Congress leaves 
the meaning of a statute ambiguous because it intends to delegate to the 
agency the task of filling in the details by regulation by bringing to bear its 
expertise in the area.262 
Stack demonstrated that when courts reach Step Two, it is the reasona-
bleness of the agency’s contemporaneous rationale that is to be tested, not a 
post-hoc rationale offered in litigation.263  That is, Chenery constrains 
courts’ exercise of Chevron deference by limiting the agency’s position to 
which deference is owed to that which it took at the time the decision was 
made.264  As Stack argued, the nondelegation account of Chenery, which 
preconditions the permissible exercise of agency action upon the agency 
contemporaneously providing a reason for its action, shows the common 
origins of both doctrines: ensuring Congress’s delegation to the agency was 
                                                          
 257.  See id. at 984–85 (citing to Mahler to explain how the Court enforces the contingency 
theory of delegation by finding that specified contingency conditions are present). 
 258.  Id. at 988; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (invalidating the 
President’s ban of “hot oil” in part due to a lack of finding even where the statute did not contain 
an express finding requirement).   
 259.  Stack, supra note 175, at 1005. 
 260.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).  
 261.  See Vill. of Barrington, Ill. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 659–60 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (explaining that if Congress has not unambiguously foreclosed the agency’s statutory inter-
pretation and there is some ambiguity that has left the agency within a range of possibilities, the 
agency will have survived Chevron Step One, leaving the court for Chevron Step Two to defer to 
the agency’s interpretation if it offered a reasonable explanation for it). 
 262.  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (deferring when “Congress . . . explicitly left a gap for 
the agency to fill”); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (explaining 
that Chevron deference applies when it is “apparent from the agency’s generally conferred author-
ity and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak 
with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted 
law”). 
 263.  Stack, supra note 175, at 1006 (citing as an example Kansas City v. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., 923 F.2d 188, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).  
 264.  Id. at 1007. 
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actually exercised by the agency.265  Stack succinctly described the relation-
ship between the two doctrines: “Chenery is the coin with which the agency 
pays for Chevron deference.”266  That is, without Chenery, agencies would 
be free not to articulate a rationale for their actions and courts would balk at 
deferring to rationales with which the agency may not even agree, as they 
may have been dreamed up only for the purpose of litigation.267 
Another account of Chenery, while diverging from Stack’s in its theo-
retical underpinnings, also closely links Chenery to Chevron deference.  
Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule reframe major administrative law 
doctrines, including Chenery and Chevron, not as primarily allocating pow-
er between the branches of government like a nondelegation account does, 
but rather as allocating power between different actors within the agencies 
themselves.268  They identify Chenery and Chevron as two judicial review 
doctrines that have a common effect of empowering policy professionals 
and agency experts over lawyers.269 
For Chenery, requiring the reasons given at the time the decision was 
made to be the sole grounds on which an agency action can be upheld 
means that various types of professionals, including technical and policy 
experts, are involved in the ex ante decisionmaking.270  On this theory, law-
yers may be involved, too, but they will not be the only or dominant 
force.271  Without Chenery, an agency’s actions can be defended on any 
ground once challenged in court, which would empower the lawyers repre-
senting the agency to claim a central role, formulating the justifications that 
will be argued in court and representations that will be made on behalf of 
the agency.272  For exactly this reason, Judge Patricia Wald once offered 
advice to agencies “that it is more important to ‘moot’ the drafters of their 
                                                          
 265.  See id. at 992 (arguing that the Chenery principle’s implementation of the express state-
ment requirement promotes political accountability, nonarbitrariness, and regularity). 
 266.  Id. at 959.  
 267.  Id. at 958–59.  
 268.  See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1035 (arguing that within agencies, adminis-
trative law allocates power among professionals like lawyers, scientists, civil servants, and politi-
cians, as well as agency heads, bureaucrats, and line personnel).  
 269.  See id. at 1043–44, 1046, 1048 (noting that Chenery ensures that non-lawyers always 
have an ex ante role in developing agency positions, and that under Chevron, a lawyer’s role is 
constrained to identifying the range of reasonable statutory interpretations while policymaking 
officials choose within the range).  The courts also acknowledge Chenery as acting as a constraint 
on lawyers.  See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971) 
(holding litigation documents an inadequate basis of review under Chenery), abrogated on other 
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).   
 270.  Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1043–44.  
 271.  Id. at 1044.  
 272.  Id. at 1043.  
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regulations prior to issuance than the lawyers who go to court to defend 
those regulations.”273 
In conjunction with Chenery, Chevron has much the same effect.  As 
Magill and Vermeule describe, Chevron is premised on the notion that there 
may not be a single correct statutory interpretation of an ambiguous provi-
sion.274  Rather, the premise is that agencies will exercise their policy ex-
pertise to elect one among multiple permissible options.275  The concept has 
been recently described as “Chevron space,” boundaries within which the 
agency is free to make policy decisions with the force of law and without 
judicial interference.276  If Chevron does not apply, a court will eventually 
decide precisely what a statute means and, as a result, the lawyers within 
the agency will take a central role in advising the agency on the proper 
meaning of the statute.277  When, however, an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute will be given Chevron deference, policymakers and experts will be 
empowered to choose the agency’s path within the range of possibilities 
contemplated under the statute.278  Moreover, under this view, Magill and 
Vermeule also posit that Chenery and Chevron are linked insofar as 
Chenery defines exactly what views are entitled to Chevron deference.279 
B.  Deference Under FOIA Justifies Chenery 
Under the leading theoretical frameworks used to understand the 
Chenery principle, Chenery is thus inextricably tied to the doctrine of Chev-
ron deference.  Of course, Chevron deference is never implicated in FOIA 
cases because FOIA is not administered by any particular agency, but ap-
                                                          
 273.  Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the 
Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 639 (1994). 
 274.  See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1046 (discussing “agency interpretation as a 
choice . . . [between a] range of reasonable interpretations”). 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  See Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” 
and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) (“The whole idea of ‘agency’ is 
that the agent has a certain authority, a zone of responsibility legislatively conferred upon it.”).   
 277.  Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1046–47. 
 278.  Id. at 1046. 
 279.  Id. at 1048–49.  Magill and Vermeule use Justice Scalia’s minority view, which would 
grant Chevron deference in a much wider range of scenarios than the current doctrine permits, in 
order to illuminate how permitting Chevron deference to anything less than official pronounce-
ments contemporaneous with the decision eviscerates, in those instances, Chenery.  Id.; see also 
Stack, supra note 175, at 1005 (stating that “[t]he clearest point of connection between Chevron 
and Chenery is that compliance with the Chenery principle operates as a condition for the agency 
to receive deference in Chevron”).  For an argument that Scalia’s view is no longer the minority, 
see Peter Strauss, In Search of Skidmore 8–9 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 13-355, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2287343. 
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plies equally across the executive branch.280  Moreover, FOIA denial letters 
do not have precedential value or the “force of law” as is required to invoke 
Chevron deference.281  Thus, to extend Chenery to the FOIA context would 
necessarily invoke Chenery where Chevron does not apply. 
Extending Chenery beyond circumstances where Chevron deference 
applies, however, has ample precedential support.  Chevron is a deference 
doctrine that applies only to agencies’ legal interpretations.282  Other defer-
ence doctrines are, instead, rooted in the APA itself and apply to factual de-
termination and discretionary decisions.283  Judge Henry Friendly, in a 
foundational treatment of Chenery, argued that Chenery should apply to 
limit the inquiry concerning the rationales or reasons for a particular con-
clusion, but should not apply to mandate reversal every time the agency 
made an erroneous subsidiary fact finding.284  Rather, erroneous fact find-
ing, according to Judge Friendly, should be dealt with only substantively 
under the substantial evidence or other appropriate standard of review.285  
Judge Friendly also urged courts to distinguish between inadequate reasons 
and the Chenery doctrine itself, which concerns impermissible reasons.286 
These distinctions, however, have not taken root in judicial deci-
sions.287  While perhaps undertheorized, courts have applied Chenery equal-
ly when deferential review of fact-finding or discretionary decisionmaking 
is invoked.288  For instance, in Burlington Truck Lines v. United States,289 
the Supreme Court invoked Chenery in refusing to consider factual asser-
tions advanced by an agency in an attempt to justify a discretionary choice 
of remedy.290  In that case, Chevron deference was never in play; rather, the 
                                                          
 280.  See AT&T, Inc., v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 496 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 131 
S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (declining to give Chevron deference to FCC in FOIA case).   
 281.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (refusing to apply Chevron 
deference to tariff decisions with no precedential value and without “the force of law”).   
 282.  Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833–34 
(2001). 
 283.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 
 284.  Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Adminis-
trative Orders, DUKE L.J. 199, 205, 207 (1969).   
 285.  Id. at 205–06.   
 286.  Id. at 206.  
 287.  See Stack, supra note 175, at 964 (noting that courts have not “cabined Chenery’s appli-
cation to the particular deficiency at issue in Chenery—agency reliance on a legal error”).  
 288.  See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167–69 (1962) (apply-
ing Chenery in a case reviewed under the APA’s “substantial evidence” and abuse of discretion 
standards).   
 289.  371 U.S. 156 (1962). 
 290.  Id. at 168; see also ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987) (ex-
plaining that Chenery precludes a court from affirming “on a basis containing any element of dis-
cretion—including discretion to find facts and interpret statutory ambiguities—that is not the basis 
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APA substantial evidence and abuse of discretion standards governed re-
view.291  In fact, Chenery has been invoked in some of the very same cases 
that have defined key APA standards of review that have nothing to do with 
Chevron, such as State Farm, which described the “hard look” version of 
arbitrary or capricious review.292  Moreover, courts have explicitly linked 
the APA’s requirements to provide reasons justifying certain types of deci-
sions to the Chenery doctrine, rather than disaggregating them, as Judge 
Friendly proposed.293  As a result, the Chenery principle is applied in re-
viewing nearly all types of administrative decisions reviewed under defer-
ential standards, and has not been constrained to situations involving Chev-
ron deference or formal delegations of lawmaking authority by Congress.294 
When the purpose and operation of types of deference other than 
Chevron are examined, the theoretical underpinnings of Chenery and its 
linkage to Chevron justify Chenery’s application to decisions entitled to 
statutory deference by analogy.  As described above, the theoretical link be-
tween the Chenery principle and Chevron deference is that they act in con-
cert to ensure that agency expertise is actually brought to bear in areas with-
in the agency’s congressionally assigned purview.295  Relatedly, they ensure 
that the courts are not deferring to (and thus empowering) the wrong set of 
actors: lawyers representing the agency in litigation.296 
Those same principles animate other types of deference.  While Chev-
ron deference arises from Congress’s delegation of lawmaking authority to 
an agency, APA deference standards are themselves also prescribed by 
Congress.297  Standards of review have long operated as a way of assigning 
                                                          
the agency used, since that would remove the discretionary judgment from the agency to the 
court”).   
 291.  Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 167.   
 292.  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 49–50 (1983) 
(refusing to consider post-hoc factual assertions under Chenery in reviewing a discretionary deci-
sion under APA standards in a case having nothing to do with Chevron deference); see also Citi-
zens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417 (1971) (same), abrogated on other 
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
 293.  See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 402, 417, 419–20 (linking Chenery to the APA’s re-
quirement that the court review the whole record); Gatewood v. Outlaw, 560 F.3d 843, 846–47 
(8th Cir. 2009) (linking Chenery to deference afforded under the APA). 
 294.  But see Stack, supra note 175, at 1012 (arguing that Chenery should not apply if an agen-
cy lacks the authority to issue binding interpretations of law and thus its interpretations of a statute 
are reviewed using Skidmore deference, rather than Chevron deference).   
 295.  See supra Part III.A.2.  Under the nondelegation constitutional account, Chenery and 
Chevron deference have common origins: ensuring that the agency is acting within its power as 
delegated by Congress.  Stack, supra note 175, at 982.   
 296.  See supra Part III.A.2.  On the policy-based account, Chenery has the effect of empower-
ing agency professionals and experts, and disempowering, relatively speaking, the agency’s law-
yers.  Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1046. 
 297.  See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (statutorily enumerating APA standards of review, including 
deferential standards such as arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion and substantial evidence). 
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primary responsibility between reviewing courts and initial decisionmak-
ers.298  When Congress prescribes a deferential standard of review, the ini-
tial decisionmaker is assigned greater responsibility, even if that responsi-
bility is not lawmaking authority delegated from Congress.299  Moreover, 
these assignments of responsibility are typically based on a view of the cor-
rect decisionmaker in light of relative expertise.300  In any situation in 
which the courts owe agencies deference, the Chenery principle, in turn, 
operates to ensure that agency professionals actually exercise the responsi-
bility they are assigned.301 
The observed deference in FOIA cases, which empirical evidence sug-
gests is even stronger than other types of deference to agencies, justifies the 
application of Chenery for these same reasons.  First, while deference under 
FOIA is a murkier proposition, as Congress formally chose a de novo 
standard of review, Congress still made a key assignment of responsibility 
to agencies in the FOIA context in the form of a reasons-giving require-
ment, suggesting that Congress wanted the agency, not its DOJ lawyers, to 
provide reasons.302  Second, in deferring to agencies in FOIA litigation, 
courts treat agencies as exercising expertise and discretion, and employing 
Chenery to ensure that expertise and discretion are actually exercised is 
therefore justified by the functional deference given.303  Thus, like in other 
contexts in which Chenery has extended beyond cases invoking Chevron 
deference, the Chenery principle should apply to FOIA review. 
1.  Congressional Assignment 
Courts have often relied on the Chenery decision in conjunction with 
governing statutes to conclude that post-hoc rationalizations will not be 
considered.  For instance, the Chenery decision and resulting Chenery prin-
                                                          
 298.  Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisionmak-
ing, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 47–48 (2000).  
 299.  It is worth at least considering that there is some amount of consensus that Congress’s 
intent to allocate authority to interpret ambiguous statutory provisions is a fiction, whereas the 
deferential standards in the APA were carefully considered by Congress and positively enacted.  
See Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 771, 
792 (2002) (noting the fiction of delegation); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1559 
(1996) (detailing the tortured legislative history of the APA, including the standard of review pro-
visions).   
 300.  See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1043–44 (arguing that Chenery’s effect is to 
reallocate power horizontally within agencies). 
 301.  Id. 
 302.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 303.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
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ciple predate the enactment of the APA.304  Nonetheless, courts have at 
times relied on APA provisions to invoke Chenery, or at least to explain 
Chenery’s integral role in administrative law.  For example, in extending 
the Chenery principle to informal decisionmaking in Overton Park, the Su-
preme Court relied on Chenery and the APA in the same breath.305  Specifi-
cally, the Court referenced the APA’s requirement that the court review 
“the ‘whole record’” when an agency action is challenged.306  In other cas-
es, the Court has relied on other statutory requirements as an alternative ra-
tionale for applying Chenery.307  In State Farm, the Supreme Court refused 
to consider post-hoc rationales in reviewing a notice-and-comment rule-
making, citing both Chenery and the governing motor vehicle statute.308  
The Court found it relevant that the motor vehicle statute specifically re-
quired a record of the rulemaking to be compiled and submitted to the re-
viewing court and that the reviewing court uphold any outcome supported 
by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.309 
An analogous rationale provides strong support for applying the 
Chenery principle in the FOIA context, as the text of FOIA itself suggests 
Chenery’s application.  FOIA details the specific procedures agencies must 
follow in responding to a FOIA request.310  Agencies are under a strict 
twenty business day deadline to respond to a request for records made un-
der FOIA, by which the agency must “notify the person making such re-
quest of such determination and the reasons therefor, and of the right of 
such person to appeal to the head of the agency any adverse determina-
tion.”311 
This requirement that agencies state their reasons for a FOIA denial is 
even more explicit than the statutory bases relied on by the Supreme Court 
to extend Chenery beyond formal proceedings in Overton Park and State 
Farm.312  In fact, in the FOIA context, there need not be any mystery about 
where a reasons-giving requirement originates: it is explicitly laid out in the 
text of the statute itself.313  The APA has no such explicit reasons-giving 
                                                          
 304.  The APA was enacted on June 11, 1946, after Chenery was decided on February 1, 1943.  
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946); SEC v. Chenery 
(Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
 305.  Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417, 419 (1971), abrogated 
on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
 306.  Id. at 419; 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 307.  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983) 
(using the governing motor vehicle statute as a rationale for applying Chenery). 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Id. at 43–44. 
 310.  5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 311.  Id. § 552(a)(6)(A) (emphasis added).  
 312.  See supra text accompanying notes 304–310. 
 313.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A). 
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requirement as to other informal adjudications.314 As Stack has compelling-
ly argued in other contexts, a reasons-giving requirement goes hand-in-hand 
with refusing to consider post-hoc rationalizations proffered by the agen-
cy’s lawyers in litigation.315  After all, it is unclear exactly what good the 
reasons-giving requirement serves if the reasons stated need not be the ac-
tual reasons justifying the agency’s decision.  In fact, the reasons-giving re-
quirement in FOIA indicates that Congress wanted the agency, not the 
court, to supply the reasons for the decision.316  Although not a formal dele-
gation of interpretive authority as would invoke Chevron deference, this 
reasons-giving requirement represents Congress’s assignment of responsi-
bility in requiring agencies to articulate the basis for their own actions. 
Moreover, FOIA administrative processing practices already meet this 
statutory requirement.  Currently, a typical response from an agency in 
which it denies access to requested records contains a description of the 
records withheld, including their quantity and length, and the exemption to 
disclosure that is claimed as to each record or portion thereof.317  There is 
also normally a very brief statement explaining why the claimed exemption 
applies to the materials.318  Sometimes, response letters are much more de-
tailed, but the typical letter has at least this much information.319 
Given FOIA’s existing procedures, applying Chenery would not re-
quire any further process or the development of a record at the agency level.  
Instead, the agency would simply be limited to relying on the rationale that 
                                                          
 314.  See id. § 557 (enumerating requirements for decisions pertaining only to formal adjudica-
tions and exempting out informal adjudications).  Informal rulemakings are subject to an explicit 
reasons-giving requirement under the APA.  See id. § 553(c) (“After consideration of the relevant 
matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of 
their basis and purpose.”). 
 315.  Stack, supra note 175, at 1008. 
 316.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (requiring agencies to provide FOIA requesters with reasons 
for their determinations). 
 317.  See Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 13–14, Shannahan v. IRS, 680 F. Supp. 
2d 1270 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (No. C08-0452JLR) (providing a copy of a request denial that details 
the volume of withheld records and cites exemptions relied upon); Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, exh. 4, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84782 (E.D. 
La. 2010) (No. 09-6732-AJM-JCW) (providing a copy of a request denial which described a ra-
tionale for the application of exemption 4 to certain withheld records); Complaint, exh. 2, 
Goodrich Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 593 F. Supp. 2d 184 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 08-1625-JDB) (providing a 
copy of the request denial, which lists each withheld document and cites exemptions as to each); 
Plaintiff’s Opposition and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, exh. H, Chesapeake Bay Found., 
Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 677 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 09-01054-JDB) 
(providing a copy of a request denial that detailed the number of pages withheld and the exemp-
tions claimed). 
 318.  See GUIDE TO FOIA, supra note 68, at 93–94 (discussing the requirements the agency 
must follow when preparing a FOIA denial letter, including making a reasonable effort to estimate 
the amount of withheld material and must provide the reasons for the withholding). 
 319.  Id. 
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it articulated in the original denial letter when its decision is challenged in 
court, and thus Chenery might incentivize the agency to respond more 
thoughtfully at the outset.  Although the agency should be limited not only 
in the specific exemption claimed, but also in its reasoning for applying that 
exemption, determining whether the agency has strayed too far from its 
proffered rationale is not unlike the work courts already perform in deter-
mining whether an error is preserved for appeal.320  The task is well suited 
to the judiciary and does not constitute an overreaching into agency policy 
matters. 
The reasons-giving requirement in FOIA’s statutory text provides a 
strong rationale for courts to adopt the Chenery principle as effectuating 
Congress’s allocation of responsibility to the agencies to articulate the rea-
sons for their actions.  Without having to acknowledge the problematic def-
erence practices in FOIA litigation, courts might even be able to rely exclu-
sively on this provision to justify the application of Chenery. 
2.  Expertise 
Chenery’s application to FOIA litigation is also justified by the reality 
of deference given to agencies’ positions in FOIA litigation.321  Much of the 
deference courts give in practice to agency positions in FOIA litigation is 
premised on agencies’ officials exercising expertise in administering 
FOIA.322  Tellingly, spoken deference arises in areas typically within the 
executive branch’s core—if not exclusive—purview, such as national secu-
rity and law enforcement.323  Spoken deference has also begun to appear in 
areas that concern the agency’s own operations, such as the deliberative 
process privilege.324  The areas in which courts have expressly deferred to 
agencies make clear that courts view the agency as exercising expertise that 
should be respected.325  Indeed, while agencies may not be viewed as hav-
ing expertise in FOIA law per se, courts repeatedly treat agencies’ represen-
tations about the application of FOIA law to the agencies’ own records as 
properly within the agencies’ competency.326 
One case decided by the D.C. Circuit contains a debate between the 
majority and dissenting opinions that crystallizes the difference between al-
                                                          
 320.  Cf. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 115–16 (2000) (comparing Chenery’s operation con-
straining agency arguments in litigation to waiver rules constraining litigants’ arguments on ap-
peal).   
 321.  Verkuil, supra note 12, at 730; Kwoka, supra note 21, at 196–200.   
 322.  Kwoka, supra note 21, at 201. 
 323.  See supra Part II.A. (synthesizing spoken deference doctrines). 
 324.  See supra Part II.A. (synthesizing spoken deference doctrines). 
 325.  Kwoka, supra note 21, at 211–12. 
 326.  Id. at 201. 
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lowing attorneys in litigation to form the agency’s position and respecting 
the expertise of agency staff.  In Center for National Security Studies v. De-
partment of Justice,327 the D.C. Circuit affirmed DOJ’s denial of a request 
for the names of individuals detained on immigration charges and as mate-
rial witnesses in the course of a post-September 11 investigation.328  In so 
doing, the court expressly deferred to the agency’s position that revealing 
the identities of the detainees would interfere with the ongoing law en-
forcement investigation because the case involved matters of national secu-
rity.329  Judge David Tatel, dissenting, took issue not with the majority’s 
decision to defer to the agency’s judgments, but with the particular repre-
sentations to which the court deferred.330  Specifically, he criticized the ma-
jority’s acceptance of a representation made in DOJ’s brief that, although 
some identities of detainees had been made known, those disclosures were 
made strategically so as not to impede the investigation.331  As Judge Tatel 
wrote: 
While this may well be so, it is an argument of counsel, and 
though the court accepts it, FOIA requires that the agency—not 
counsel—explain such judgments under oath.  The reason for this 
requirement is clear: We owe deference to agency expertise, not 
to lawyers defending the agency in litigation.  If there are legiti-
mate investigative reasons for releasing the names of some de-
tainees, but not others, then [the agency official who did submit a 
declaration] or others responsible for the terrorism investigation 
should explain those reasons under oath—in an in camera affida-
vit, if necessary to protect the information—and that explanation 
would probably warrant judicial deference.332 
That is, deference is properly accorded to the reasoning articulated by 
agencies, not to the positions taken by lawyers representing the agencies in 
litigation.  Although Judge Tatel did not address the additional question of 
                                                          
 327.  331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 328.  Id. at 937.  The court also affirmed the agency’s withholding of other information related 
to the detainees, including circumstances of their arrest, detention, and representation by legal 
counsel.  Id.  
 329.  See id. at 928, 932 (“[We] join the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits in holding that the 
courts must defer to the executive on decisions of national security.  In so deferring, we do not 
abdicate the role of the judiciary.  Rather, in undertaking a deferential review we simply recognize 
the different roles underlying the constitutional separation of powers.  It is within the role of the 
executive to acquire and exercise the expertise of protecting national security.  It is not within the 
role of the courts to second-guess executive judgments made in furtherance of that branch’s prop-
er role.”).  This is an example of spoken deference that arose under exemption 7 of FOIA, which 
covers certain law enforcement records.  Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2012).  
 330.  Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 944 (Tatel, J., dissenting).  
 331.  Id. 
 332.  Id. (citations omitted).  
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timing—that is, contemporaneous reasons versus post-hoc rationaliza-
tions—his position clearly demonstrates the danger of deference uncon-
strained by Chenery.333  In Center for National Security Studies, the majori-
ty deferred to factual statements that were not even in the form of 
admissible evidence, much less facts on which the agency relied to come to 
its position that was under review.334 
As Chenery’s operation in other contexts makes clear, however, agen-
cy expertise is only respected if the lawyers must defend the agency’s ac-
tions based on the rationale provided by the agency at the time the decision 
was made.335  Thus, the courts defer not to a post-hoc litigator-crafted posi-
tion, but to the professional staff of the agency charged with carrying out its 
substantive work.336  Setting aside the inappropriateness of any sort of def-
erence in the FOIA context, it is doubly inappropriate to give deference to 
the lawyers representing the agency in litigation who, after all, lack the sub-
ject-matter expertise that sits at the core of deferential standards of re-
view.337 
Indeed, as FOIA litigation currently stands, agencies are represented 
not by in-house lawyers, but by lawyers from the DOJ.338  Without any 
Chenery constraint, lawyers representing the agency in litigation are em-
powered to rely on any justification they feel may support the agency’s un-
derlying decision, regardless of whether it is a justification the agency itself 
would agree with or would have adopted.  Those positions, as the reality of 
FOIA litigation reveals, will receive both spoken and unspoken defer-
ence.339 
The notion that agency expertise is invoked in FOIA is also consistent 
with a growing movement toward professionalizing FOIA officers, the 
agency-level employees responsible for processing FOIA requests and issu-
ing responses.  Improving the administration of FOIA at the agency level 
                                                          
 333.  Id. at 951–52.  
 334.  Id. at 940. 
 335.  Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1044. 
 336.  Id. at 1043–44. 
 337.  Id. at 1044. 
 338.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOIA UPDATE, NO. 3, FOIA LITIGATION REQUIRES 
COORDINATION (1985), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_updates/Vol_VI_3/page1.htm (stating that the Department of Jus-
tice almost always represents the defendant agency on behalf of the government); see also Magill 
& Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1060 (noting that most agencies are represented by the Depart-
ment of Justice in litigation generally).  
 339.  While it is true that an agency must submit affidavits to support its motion for summary 
judgment or to oppose a requester’s motion for summary judgment, FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4), those 
affidavits are often drafted by the lawyers representing the agency and, in any case, are directed to 
be created by those lawyers in light of the legal strategy and positions the lawyers have decided 
are most likely to prevail in court.  
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was a key concern of FOIA reform legislation enacted in 2007.340  To that 
end, one provision of the OPEN Government Act directed the Office of 
Personnel Management (“OPM”) to conduct a study and submit a report to 
Congress on whether and how to improve personnel policies to encourage 
all federal employees generally to better comply with FOIA and, more spe-
cifically, to “enhance the stature of officials administering [FOIA] within 
the executive branch.”341  The provision went on to require OPM to consid-
er whether a minimum pay scale for FOIA professionals should be estab-
lished and whether there should be other changes to ensure a career track 
with advancement possibilities for those officials.342 
While OPM’s subsequent report fell far short of advocates’ hopes, the 
reaction it provoked demonstrates a concerted movement toward profes-
sionalization of personnel dedicated to FOIA administration.  OPM report-
ed to the Senate that addressing the stature of access professionals within 
agencies should be left to the leadership of individual agencies, and not ad-
dressed through any executive-wide action.343  It also recommended against 
establishing a minimum rate of pay or additional advancement opportuni-
ties.344  The American Society of Access Professionals (“ASAP”), the pri-
mary professional organization for FOIA and privacy personnel, immedi-
ately responded with a call for OPM to reconsider its position, calling its 
initial letter a lost opportunity to increase the seriousness with which agen-
cy officials treat not only FOIA professionals, but also the overarching 
goals of transparency those professionals are charged with administering.345  
The requester community, as represented by a group of twenty organiza-
tions and advocacy groups as well as prominent named individuals, made a 
similar plea, noting OPM’s process for reaching its conclusions was woe-
fully inadequate.346 
                                                          
 340.  See generally Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 2007 
(OPEN Government Act), Pub. L. No. 110–175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007) (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. § 552) (containing various provisions addressing administrative performance under FOIA).   
 341.  Id. § 11(1)(B), 121 Stat. at 2530. 
 342.  Id. 
 343.  Letter from Michael W. Hager, Acting Dir., U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., to Richard 
Cheney, President of the Senate 1 (Dec. 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.openthegovernment.org/sites/default/files/otg/DMS%2015028%20Final.pdf.  
 344.  Id. at 2–3.  
 345.  Letter from Claire Shanley, Exec. Dir., Am. Soc’y of Access Prof’ls, to John Berry, Dir., 
U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. (Apr. 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.openthegovernment.org/sites/default/files/otg/ASAP%20Response%20to%20OPM-
%20Final%2027%20Apr%202009%20doc.pdf. 
 346.  Letter from The Nat’l Sec. Archive, et. al., to John Berry, Dir., U.S. Office of Pers. 
Mgmt. (June 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.openthegovernment.org/sites/default/files/otg/OPM%20Report%20letter-Final.pdf. 
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These responses demonstrate an increase in focus on adequately re-
warding the work of FOIA personnel and encouraging transparency through 
greater professionalization.347  In various contexts, researchers have found 
that denials of FOIA requests most often stem from a lack of understanding 
about the legal requirements of disclosure.348  As one researcher found, 
“[m]ost of the problems with the way records custodians respond to re-
quests for government information encountered in this study might be alle-
viated in one way: standardized formal training.”349  ASAP offers a menu of 
training opportunities, including its main annual training conference, di-
rected at FOIA professionals.350  These initiatives show, therefore, that 
there exists an increased focus on fostering and rewarding expertise among 
the agency-level personnel handling FOIA requests and issuing responses. 
In addition to potentially exercising their expertise, agency officials 
have the option to release records as a matter of discretion in many cases, 
even if the records fall within an exemption to disclosure.351  That agencies 
make discretionary determinations under FOIA invokes another key con-
cern of administrative law: keeping agencies politically accountable.352  
Chenery promotes political accountability for decisionmaking by ensuring 
that “agency policy [has] been embraced by the most politically responsive 
and public actors within the agency,” rather than DOJ lawyers whose re-
sponsibility for decisionmaking is both attenuated and not transparent.353 
Given that courts engage in both spoken and unspoken deference in 
FOIA cases to the great advantage of agency defendants, at a minimum that 
deference should be constrained by directing it at the relevant actors and the 
                                                          
 347.  See Melissa Davenport & Margaret B. Kwoka, Good But Not Great: Improving Access to 
Public Records Under the D.C. Freedom of Information Act, 13 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 359, 382–83 
(2010) (showing significant resistance, including letters from officials at the American Society of 
Access Professionals, to an OPM report to Congress which stated that no changes to the profes-
sionalization of FOIA officers was necessary).  
 348.  See, e.g., Michele Bush Kimball, Law Enforcement Records Custodians’ Decision-
Making Behaviors in Response to Florida’s Public Records Law, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 313, 351 
(2003) (“This study showed that records custodians do not completely understand the provisions 
of public records laws.  As a result, records custodians are denying access to information that 
should be available to the public.”); see also Davenport & Kwoka, supra note 347, at 384 (citing 
Freedom of Information Amendment Act of 2000: Hearing on Bill No. 13-829 Before the Comm. 
on Gov’t Operations, 13th. Per. 1 (D.C. 2000) (statement of Kathy Patterson, Councilmember and 
Chair, Committee on Gov’t Operations, Council of the District of Columbia) (“[T]oo often front 
line workers simply aren’t aware that the public has a clear right to public documents.”)). 
 349.  Kimball, supra note 348, at 351.  
 350. Training and Educational Programs, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ACCESS PROFESSIONALS, 
http://www.accesspro.org/programs/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
 351.  See supra text accompanying note 170. 
 352.  Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law, 
97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 852–53 (2012). 
 353.  Stack, supra note 175, at 993. 
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relevant rationales.354  Chenery is the administrative law doctrine that has 
the effect of locating power within the agency to the correct decisionmaker 
and the rationale articulated at the time of the decision, which cabins the ef-
fect of deference so that agencies do not enjoy unconstrained deference.355  
Without a shift to reinstate true de novo review in FOIA litigation, the 
standard of review cannot serve as the justification for letting the govern-
ment off the Chenery hook and allowing agencies to make new claims to 
justify their withholdings under FOIA once litigation has commenced.  The 
inextricable link between deference to agency positions and requiring agen-
cies to justify their decisions on the grounds contemporaneously articulated 
calls for the application of Chenery to FOIA litigation. 
III.  IMPROVING GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY 
Apart from whether Chenery’s application to FOIA litigation can be 
justified, there remains the question of whether applying the Chenery prin-
ciple in this context is desirable.  Unquestionably, applying Chenery to 
FOIA would constrain the deference courts give to agency positions and re-
balance the litigation dynamic by allowing courts to reverse agency deci-
sions to withhold records when they fail to fully justify their decisions in 
their initial responses to requesters.356  Because agencies would not be able 
to advance new arguments in litigation, rather than being anomalously high, 
reversal rates in FOIA cases might look like the reversal rates in other liti-
gation reviewing agency decisions, representing more meaningful judicial 
oversight.  The application of Chenery would also prevent the sandbagging 
problem that arises now (whether intentional or unintentional), in which the 
agency may not advance its strongest arguments at the administrative level, 
thereby leaving the requester in the dark as to the nature of the claims when 
evaluating whether to bring a lawsuit, only to find out once in litigation that 
the agency has an unbeatable argument.357 
Though these benefits in ensuring a more meaningful check on agency 
secrecy seem clear cut, extending Chenery to FOIA is not without compli-
cation.  Chenery is a controversial administrative law doctrine that has pro-
voked some harsh criticism about its effect on the public’s rights, agency 
administration, and judicial review.  Most notably, critics argue that the 
                                                          
 354.  See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1044 (arguing that Chenery represents a 
commitment to technical, nonlegal expertise within agencies). 
 355.  See Stack, supra note 175, at 1008–10 (explaining Chenery as a constraint on deference). 
 356.  See infra Part III.B. (explaining and citing support for the proposition that applying 
Chenery to FOIA processes will appropriately constrain agency decisionmaking).  
 357.  See supra Part II.A.2.  Even critics of Chenery admit that it is relatively effective in pre-
venting sandbagging.  See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 222, at 848 (noting that Chenery promotes 
procedural fairness and protects against agency sandbagging). 
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Chenery principle leads to inefficient proceedings and formalistic agency 
responses to judicial reversals.358  As explained in detail below, these criti-
cisms, as a practical matter, simply do not have as much force with respect 
to FOIA litigation as they do in other contexts.359  Moreover, because of the 
way FOIA litigation proceeds, Chenery may offer some unique benefits.360 
A.  Remands 
One of the most pervasive critiques of Chenery concerns the operation 
of Chenery remands.  A court applying Chenery in refusing to consider a 
new justification and reversing an agency’s action as insufficiently justified 
will typically remand the matter to the agency for it to reconsider the matter 
afresh.361  As Chenery itself illustrates, Chenery remands may result in the 
agency taking exactly the same position but advancing different reasons.362  
Thus, the plaintiff may have won the lawsuit, but may not receive any tan-
gible relief at the end of the day.363  Moreover, litigation may again ensue 
over the agency’s newly offered rationale resulting in a back-and-forth liti-
gation dynamic that has been compared to a game of Ping-Pong between 
the agency and the courts.364 
By contrast, FOIA litigation as it currently stands avoids this ineffi-
ciency.  In cases where the requester prevails and the agency’s justification 
for withholding fails, courts order the release of the records to the requester 
under FOIA.365  The judicial decision thus ends the matter and does not re-
mand the case to the agency to reconsider the question in light of the court’s 
decision or invite the agency to come up with a new way of achieving the 
                                                          
 358.  See infra Part III.A (highlighting criticism of the Chenery principle based on its allowing 
agencies to continue to promulgate the same policies, even after those policies have been rebuffed 
by courts during judicial review); see also Amy R. Motomura, Rethinking Administrative Law’s 
Chenery Doctrine: Lessons from Patent Appeals at the Federal Circuit, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
817, 861 (2013) (citing the significant inefficiencies inherent in the Chenery principle that, as 
some scholars hypothesize, have led to ossification of the administrative state). 
 359.  See infra Parts III.A–B (addressing the concerns about the Chenery principle and arguing 
that they do not apply as strongly in the FOIA context). 
 360.  See infra Parts III.A–B. 
 361.  See Friendly, supra note 284, at 205–06 (discussing the characterization of the Chenery 
principle “as upholding ‘the proposition that when an agency gives the wrong reasons for a deci-
sion . . . the reviewing court will send the case back for a new determination, even though the 
court might have upheld the order if no reasons had been assigned’”).  
 362.  SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947) (upholding, after the initial 
reversal and remand, the SEC’s identical decision not to approve the public holding utility’s reor-
ganization plan because the SEC had provided a sustainable rationale).  
 363.  Id. at 206–07. 
 364.  Murphy, supra note 222, at 820. 
 365.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012).  
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same outcome.366  A win for a FOIA requester is a full win under the cur-
rent litigation regime.  Because of this distinction, some hesitation is war-
ranted before concluding that adopting Chenery in FOIA decisions would 
help requesters regain some of the footing they have lost in the FOIA litiga-
tion dynamic. 
Despite some drawbacks associated with Chenery remands, the poten-
tial gains for both FOIA litigants and overall government transparency out-
weigh the downsides of applying Chenery to FOIA.  First, FOIA requesters 
winning their cases outright under the current litigation regime are rare: on-
ly ten percent of requesters achieve this holy grail of litigation victory.367  
Indeed, FOIA decisions are affirmed far more than other administrative de-
cisions.368  The spoken and unspoken deference doctrines that have devel-
oped uniquely in FOIA jurisprudence, combined with the lack of a Chenery 
constraint on agencies’ arguments, go a long way to explaining the gov-
ernment’s remarkably high success rate in FOIA litigation. 369  Thus, the 
current regime results in very few requester wins.370 
As numerous commentators have observed, judges often find them-
selves in seemingly difficult positions when adjudicating FOIA cases.371  
For instance, they must assess the government’s claims about national secu-
rity interests and the potential dangers that might arise from releasing rec-
ords.372  If courts err in their assessment, judges fear that improperly re-
leased records might have devastating consequences.373  The consequences 
of erroneous release may not be as vividly illustrated in those cases not in-
volving national security claims, but they are nonetheless considerable.  
Wrongly released records could, for instance, compromise individuals’ per-
                                                          
 366.  Id.; see also Green v. Dep’t of Commerce, 618 F.2d 836, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating 
that in a FOIA case a final decision “is an order by the District Court requiring release of docu-
ments by the Government to the plaintiff, or an order denying the plaintiff’s right to such re-
lease”). 
 367.  Verkuil, supra note 12, at 734. 
 368.  Zaring, supra note 22, at 169. 
 369.  See supra Part II.A.  
 370.  Verkuil, supra note 12, at 734. 
 371.  See, e.g., Fensterwald v. CIA, 443 F. Supp. 667, 668 (D.D.C. 1977) (noting that the court 
is in a difficult position in FOIA cases due to problems of proof and procedure, and because FOIA 
litigation turns on “narrowly drawn factual determinations that are not the product of adversarial 
give and take”); Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation over 
National Security Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 67, 89–90 
(1992) (discussing problems facing courts reviewing FOIA cases concerning national security, 
including the weight to give evidence and the procedures to be used to model the adversarial set-
ting). 
 372.  Fuchs, supra note 67, at 163.  
 373.  See, e.g., Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that disclosure of 
CIA research efforts “may compromise the Agency’s ability to gather intelligence as much as dis-
closure of intelligence sources”). 
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sonal privacy rights or companies’ trade secrets.374  Moreover, because the 
full adversarial process is not brought to bear in FOIA cases (albeit largely 
as a result of unspoken deference doctrines created by the courts them-
selves), courts may feel ill equipped to judge many of the governments’ 
claims.375  It is understandable that courts may err on the side of caution 
when faced with a difficult decision.  This is especially true when courts 
perceive an error in favor of disclosure as risking a very tangible harm, but 
see an error in favor of secrecy producing only a more ephemeral informa-
tional harm to a requester, which can in any case be reviewed by a higher 
court. 
The dilemma courts face, however, may partly be brought about by 
FOIA’s strong medicine.  The statute gives the district court “jurisdiction to 
enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the produc-
tion of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.”376  
As FOIA litigation currently stands without the application of Chenery, all 
arguments are considered and ruled upon with nothing left for the agency to 
do after a judgment.  Thus, the only two options are to uphold the agency’s 
decision withholding the records from the requester or to order immediate 
release of the records into the public domain under this statutory provision. 
Were Chenery to apply, it would provide a third option: a “reversal-
lite” approach.  Because courts would only consider those justifications of-
fered at the administrative level, it would have the option to reverse on 
those justifications but remand to the agency for reconsideration.  Accord-
ing to Judge Patricia Wald, a Chenery reversal “says ‘No’ to the agency, yet 
gives it a second chance with the court’s guidance to reach the result it 
thinks proper.”377  If Chenery were applied and a reverse-and-remand for 
reconsideration option were available, courts might be less reluctant to re-
verse agency decisions that are poorly supported.  For this same reason, 
even the same courts that have created the very deference that troubles 
FOIA litigation may be attracted to a solution that increases their menu of 
remedial options.  Instead of ordering the release of contested records, the 
court could remand to the agency with instructions to redo its own analysis.  
This point is worth emphasizing: requesters would likely achieve more suc-
cess and reversal rates might increase in FOIA cases if courts had more 
                                                          
 374.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), (6) (2012).  
 375.  See, e.g., Fensterwald, 443 F. Supp. at 669 (explaining the difficulty of ruling on FOIA 
claims, even when the court conducts in camera review of withheld records). 
 376.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
 377.  Patricia M. Wald, Keynote Address at the Section of Administrative Law Fall Meeting 
(Oct. 1987), The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, in 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 
507, 529 (1988). 
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available remedial options, such as the reverse and remand that Chenery 
provides.378 
Of course, a reverse and remand order does little good if the agency ar-
rives at the same conclusion, but history demonstrates that remanding to the 
agency is not necessarily an exercise in futility.  As Judge Friendly de-
scribed in a seminal article on the Chenery doctrine, Chenery usefully 
“serves the ‘think-it-over’ function.”379  Judge Friendly points to an exam-
ple in which seven of the eight supplied reasons for a decision made by the 
ICC about railroads were found by a court to be invalid and the decision 
was reversed and remanded under Chenery.380  The ICC then revisited the 
decision and concluded its initial position was in error, and it reversed its 
own initial action.381  Emily Hammond has recently demonstrated in the 
regulatory context that even when remands lead to serial litigation, benefits 
accrue: “Courts and agencies engage in fruitful discussions that lead to bet-
ter understanding of the issues and, ultimately, their resolution.”382  Alt-
hough empirical evidence is mixed, some studies strongly suggest remands 
often produce a change in agency position.  For instance, two separate stud-
ies found that certain agencies made at least some policy changes in about 
three-quarters of remanded cases.383  One study demonstrated major chang-
es about forty percent of the time.384 
Without doubt, agencies often take a different approach.  As in 
Chenery, agencies may adopt the same position on remand as they did ini-
tially, and empirical evidence suggests agencies are apt to do so when regu-
latory schemes are at issue.385  There is good reason to believe, however, 
                                                          
 378.  This conclusion is supported by empirical data.  In other administrative review contexts, 
Chenery is “one of the most common grounds for judicial reversal and remand.”  Stack, supra 
note 175, at 957 (citing Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empiri-
cal Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1035 tbl. 6); Wald, supra note 377, 
at 528.   
 379.  Friendly, supra note 284, at 209.   
 380.  Id. at 214; N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Bondholders Comm. v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 418, 
446 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).   
 381.  Friendly, supra note 284, at 214. 
 382.  Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1722, 1725 (2011).  Emily Hammond Meazell now goes by Emily Hammond.  See Facul-
ty Profiles – Emily Hammond, WAKE FOREST UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 
http://law.wfu.edu/faculty/profile/meazeleh/bio/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).  
 383.  ROBERT J. HUME, HOW COURTS IMPACT FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 91 
(2009). 
 384.  See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 378, at 1047 (describing the major changes finding with 
regard to the post-remand process). 
 385.  See William S. Jordan, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rule-
making?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 445 (2000) (concluding that agencies are still able to implement 
their overall regulatory program even after a remand).  
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that agencies are more apt to reach the same conclusion on remand in regu-
latory processes rather than adjudicatory processes such as FOIA.  Rule-
makings tend to embody agency policy goals set by high-ranking officials, 
and after an investment of time and research considering the various op-
tions.386  As reflections of the agency’s policy judgment, regulatory deci-
sions tend to be more considered and planned than adjudications, which 
tend to be more hurried, based on less extensive records, and made by low-
level staff.387  This distinction is especially true of informal adjudications 
like decisions to withhold or disclose documents pursuant to FOIA because 
they need not be decided through the formalized processes enumerated in 
the APA.  Consequently, agencies are likely not as wedded to these adjudi-
cated positions as they are to the regulations that they have determined best 
promote their policy objectives.388  In fact, as Judge Friendly noted, these 
attributes of adjudicatory administrative proceedings may suggest a greater 
need for “judicial enforcement of the requirement of reasoned decision” 
through the Chenery principle.389 
In FOIA litigation, there is an additional reason agencies may choose 
to change their position on remand: at the point of reconsidering the matter, 
the only cost to the agency of avoiding another round of litigation is releas-
ing the records.390  In Chenery II, the court noted that after Chenery I, the 
agency was “bound to deal with the problem afresh.”391  There, however, 
the result was that the agency had to go through another formalized process, 
including a hearing, taking evidence, and drafting a new decisional docu-
ment.392  Agencies faced with Chenery remands in FOIA cases, by contrast, 
may have more incentive to reevaluate their positions and to release records 
because doing so is relatively costless and reaching the same conclusion 
risks another round of litigation. 
In fact, the Ping-Pong analogy, which is used to critique Chenery on 
the grounds that it produces delay and ossification of agency process, is also 
                                                          
 386.  See Friendly, supra note 284, at 216 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of ad-
ministrative law in the 1970s specifically).  
 387.  See id. (noting that the application of Chenery to such cases could “be a blessing or a 
curse”).  
 388.  See Jordan, supra note 385, at 440 (giving an empirical account of agencies persevering 
in attaining their policy objectives in the face of judicial reversals and remands). 
 389.  Friendly, supra note 284, at 216.  
 390.  In fact, it would be even more costless for the agency to change its position on releasing 
records under FOIA when it does so on a Chenery remand than when it does so in litigation, be-
cause changing its position in litigation can result in an award of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff.  
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II) (2012) (allowing an award of attorneys’ fees when a plaintiff 
has substantially prevailed, and defining “substantially prevailed” to include “a voluntary or uni-
lateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial”).  
 391.  SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 201 (1947).  
 392.  See id. at 198–99 (describing the agency’s process after remand).  
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less apt in the FOIA adjudication context.393  Litigants challenging regula-
tions, which tend to burden them with extra requirements, may benefit from 
delay itself and thus use Chenery to effectuate a substantive outcome for a 
period of time.394  FOIA litigants, however, do not benefit from delay, and 
thus have no incentive to use Chenery as a litigation weapon against the 
agency.  If anything, since Chenery is unidirectional, aggrieved individuals 
under FOIA may be able to take advantage of it to enforce reasoned deci-
sionmaking, but cannot use it to promote a litigation strategy alone.395  Ac-
cordingly, Chenery remands, while seemingly a weak remedy (and without 
a doubt a weaker remedy than the remedy of immediate release provided 
under the statutory text of FOIA), nonetheless hold great promise for FOIA 
requesters. 
Another key benefit to requesters comes from Chenery remands, re-
gardless of the agency’s subsequent actions: the judicial precedent rejecting 
the agency’s claims of exemption.  Because Chenery would empower 
courts to reverse weak agency claims of withholding more often, courts 
would be able to create strong precedent policing the boundaries of the ex-
emptions, rather than watering them down so as to avoid what courts might 
see as a risky result.  The precedent would then bind not only future cases, 
but also administrative processing of FOIA requests.396 
Finally, not all FOIA withholdings that are reversed by courts would 
be remanded under Chenery.  Courts would still be empowered under FOIA 
to order the release of records, and the Chenery doctrine, over time, has 
admitted to some flexibility397 that could dictate when and how courts 
should simply order release of records versus reverse and remand for fur-
                                                          
 393.  NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969) (plurality opinion) (address-
ing a critique of Chenery remands as creating a Ping-Pong game between the courts and the agen-
cy).  
 394.  See Pieter M. Schenkkan, When and How Should Texas Courts Review Agency Rules?, 
47 BAYLOR L. REV. 989, 1135 (1995) (observing that “many see judicial activism as a threat that 
gives regulated industries, with their superior litigation resources, an additional means to delay or 
defeat progressive regulation”). 
 395.  See Friendly, supra note 284, at 216–17 (noting that “the prolonged process of reversal 
and remand for failure to state reasons adequately and correctly would be peculiarly painful to 
individuals needing quick relief and lacking the funds for protracted proceedings,” but that a “par-
tial answer” can be found in that Chenery “will be invoked only when the agency has denied relief 
to an individual or has proceeded against him for a wrong reason, not when it may have erred in 
doing what he wanted”).  
 396.  For instance, DOJ issues guidance to agencies to be used in processing FOIA requests 
based on judicial interpretations of FOIA.  See, e.g., DOJ Guide to the Freedom of Information 
Act: Table of Contents, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09.htm (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2014).  
 397.  Even the Supreme Court has at times strained the Chenery principle to accommodate 
competing concerns and uphold the agency’s action.  See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 669 (2007) (upholding an agency action on grounds other 
than those articulated contemporaneously). 
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ther consideration.398  For instance, Chenery remands are inappropriate 
when there is but one permissible outcome; as Judge Friendly explained, it 
is a “scarcely questionable principle that when agency action is statutorily 
compelled, it does not matter that the agency which reached the decision 
required by law did so on a debatable or even a wrong ground, for remand 
in such a case would be but a useless formality.”399  This precedent, which 
establishes a sort of “futility exception,” would justify a court in deciding 
that release of records is mandated and order the agency to do so as FOIA 
contemplates, and as courts are currently authorized to do.400  Chenery 
would simply present another option.  In fact, one recent call for reform in 
Chenery’s application would allow exactly this type of flexibility in courts’ 
application of the Chenery doctrine.401  Indeed, requesters may well contin-
ue to win outright the ten percent of FOIA cases they currently win, given 
how strong those cases have to be for the courts to overturn the agencies 
under the current regime. 
B.  Administrative Decisionmaking 
Chenery’s reason-giving requirement has been lauded as a method 
through which to improve the administrative process itself, irrespective of 
judicial review.402  Requiring and holding the agency to a contemporaneous 
justification motivates an agency to give the matter serious consideration at 
the outset, documents agency rationales that may guide its actions in the fu-
ture, and contributes to agency accountability.403  Perhaps even more than 
in other contexts, Chenery has great promise to improve the administrative 
processing of FOIA requests and responses to the benefit of all requesters, 
not just those requesters who later become litigants. 
                                                          
 398.  There may also be instances where courts should consider post-hoc rationales in FOIA 
cases despite Chenery, such as when the application of an exemption could not have been asserted 
at the time of the initial decision, but is available at the time of litigation.  See, e.g., Frito-Lay v. 
U.S. Equal Opportunity Emp’t Comm’n, 964 F. Supp. 236, 239 (W.D. Ky. 1997).  In Frito-Lay, 
the court noted that the agency invoked exemption 7(A), which covers certain law enforcement 
records relating to a pending investigation, in responding to plaintiff’s request.  Id.  By the time 
litigation commenced, the investigation was over, thereby eliminating that claim; however, anoth-
er exemption, which would not have been available to plaintiff during the investigation, was now 
appropriately invoked.  Id. 
 399.  Friendly, supra note 284, at 210.  Friendly also argues that Chenery should not require 
remand where it is clear that the agency would come to the same conclusion.  Id.  Other commen-
tators have called this the “harmless error rule” in the Chenery context.  See, e.g., Murphy, supra 
note 222, at 864–68.  
 400.  Cf. Levin, supra note 237, at 298–99 (explaining that key administrative law remedies 
have admitted to flexibility when courts feel the practical consequences of strict enforcement 
would be unduly disruptive).   
 401.  See Murphy, supra note 222, at 876–77.  
 402.  Stack, supra note 175, at 992–96. 
 403.  Murphy, supra note 222, at 849–50. 
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Stack’s linkage of Chenery to constitutional nondelegation norms also 
illuminates the link between Chenery and better administrative decision-
making generally.  He contends that Chenery promotes rule-of-law values 
because the reasons given for decisions made “have greater generality than 
the outcomes they support, [and therefore] giving a reason typically implies 
a commitment to outcomes falling within the reason’s scope.”404  In turn, a 
collection of decisions over time with articulated rationales, as Stack de-
scribes, “makes each agency action . . . a source of constraint for future ac-
tions.”405  In this way, Chenery promotes nonarbitrariness in agency deci-
sionmaking by spurring the agency to create a sort of common law for 
itself.  Judge Friendly notes that Chenery, apart from its outcome in particu-
lar cases, “should improve the administrative process” in this regard.406 
As it currently stands, administrative processing of FOIA requests is 
notoriously poor, making this processing perhaps the single biggest concern 
regarding FOIA among advocates, Congress, and FOIA users.407  Numer-
ous reports show that delay,408 over-withholding,409 and nonresponsive-
ness410 are rampant across agencies and FOIA offices.  Congress has made 
                                                          
 404.  Stack, supra note 175, at 997. 
 405.  Id. at 998.  
 406.  Friendly, supra note 284, at 210. 
 407.  See WENDY GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
(FOIA): BACKGROUND AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE 113TH CONGRESS 13–14, 16 (2013) (not-
ing that use of some exemptions by agencies is growing and observing that “every Congress since 
the 109th” has introduced “a bill entitled the Faster FOIA Act”); Administration of the Freedom of 
Information Act: Current Trends: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Information Policy, Census, 
and National Archives of the H.R. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. 41–
50 (2010) (statement of Larry F. Gottesman, Nat’l FOIA Officer, EPA) (testifying that the EPA 
took aggressive steps to decrease the backlog of FOIA requests, including revising procedures and 
processes, and deploying updated information technology tools). 
 408.  See Nate Jones, The Rubber Hasn’t Met the Road.  Response to the Department of Trans-
portation’s Letter to the Washington Post, NSA ARCHIVE (Mar. 23, 2011), 
http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2011/03/23/the-rubber-hasnt-met-the-road-response-to-the-
department-of-transportations-letter-to-the-washington-post/ (noting that the average response 
time for a simple FOIA request to the Department of Transportation is 141 days); see also NAT’L 
SEC. ARCHIVE, JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED 1 (2003), available at 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB102/tenoldest.pdf (finding that as of 2003, 
the oldest FOIA requests dated back to the 1980s); Press Release, Public Citizen, Despite Progress 
in Transparency, Obama Administration Still Slow to Act on Freedom of Information Requests 
(Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3084 (finding that, 
while the Obama Administration has increased its efforts toward greater government transparency, 
FOIA delays and backlogs still persist); FOIA’s 40th Anniversary – Bigger Backlogs and Poor 
Planning, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T (July 11, 2006), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/2988 
(finding that FOIA’s backlogs have been increasing). 
 409.  Sam Kim, FOIA Performance Goes from Bad to Worst, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T 
(Aug. 21, 2007), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3411 (noting a rise in denials of infor-
mation). 
 410.  Lauren Harper, Why Agencies Should Not be Allowed to Lie About FOIA Requests, NSA 
ARCHIVE (Oct. 25, 2011), http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2011/10/25/foia-what-is-it-good-
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various legislative efforts to reform administrative processing in response to 
these problems.  For instance, in the 2007 OPEN Government Act, Con-
gress established the position of “FOIA Liaison” in each agency, a position 
dedicated to serving the public by answering concerns about their FOIA re-
quests and assisting in the resolution of disputes about request pro-
cessing.411  Congress also mandated individualized tracking numbers for 
requests412 and created penalties for agency delays.413 
Moreover, all but a tiny fraction of FOIA denials are ever challenged 
in court, making the administrative process the final word on almost every 
FOIA request.414  Improving the administrative processing of FOIA re-
quests is, therefore, crucial to improving FOIA as a tool for government 
transparency.  Chenery’s effect of incentivizing more resources to be spent 
at the agency level in this context would be a net benefit to all FOIA re-
questers, and therefore serve to increase government transparency.415  Pro-
moting reasoned decisionmaking at the front-end is far more effective in the 
FOIA context than back-end corrections by the courts.  Moreover, 
Chenery’s promise in the FOIA context may be even greater than in other 
contexts in which agencies have more built-in incentives to invest in the 
administrative process. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
FOIA litigation has proven to be a far more feeble bulwark against 
governmental attempts to conduct its affairs in secret than Congress envi-
sioned.  As deference has crept into FOIA jurisprudence and agencies have 
been subjected to less and less judicial oversight, affirmance rates in FOIA 
cases are among the highest of any type of administrative action reviewed 
in federal court.  Compounding the problem, the deference that courts give 
                                                          
for%E2%80%A6if-the-justice-department-has-its-way/ (reporting on a problem of agencies false-
ly responding that records responsive to a FOIA request do not exist).   
 411.  Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 2007 (OPEN Gov-
ernment Act), Pub. L. 110–175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552).   
 412.  Id. § 7.  
 413.  See id. § 6(b) (instituting a penalty in the form of barring the agency from collecting cer-
tain fees from requesters).  
 414.  In fiscal year 2011, 644,165 FOIA requests were made, resulting in 438,638 final agency 
decisions, 202,164 of which denied access either to all of the requested records or at least some 
portion of them at the administrative level.  What Is FOIA?: FOIA Data at a Glance—FY 2008 
through FY 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.foia.gov (last visited Apr. 23, 2013).  Over 
the last thirty years, however, only about three hundred to five hundred lawsuits challenging agen-
cy denials are decided by the courts each year.  See Federal Court Cases: Integrated Database, 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/landing.jsp  (select “Find & Analyze 
Data,” then search for “federal judicial center integrated database”) (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).  
 415.  See Stack, supra note 175, at 971.  Stack notes that Chenery “increases the resources that 
agencies must devote to explaining the decisions they make.”  Id. 
KwokaFinalBookProof 5/14/2014  10:51 AM 
2014] Deference, Chenery, and FOIA 1119 
to agencies in FOIA litigation is not constrained by Chenery’s requirement 
that the agency justify its action on the rationale offered at the time the de-
cision was made rather than post hoc.  So long as courts continue to defer to 
agency decisions to withhold government documents rather than apply the 
true de novo review standard explicitly required by the statute, Chenery’s 
application to FOIA litigation promises to even the playing field between 
agencies and requesters.  Moreover, applying Chenery may push reversal 
rates in FOIA litigation closer to the norm across administrative law, restore 
litigation as a means to check agency secrecy, and improve administrative 
processing of FOIA requests even for those requesters who will never liti-
gate a denial of information access. 
